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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on the determinants of voting behavior.
In Chapter 1, I empirically examine why candidates who are listed first on voting ballots
enjoy substantial advantages such as winning 10% more elections. I use Californian election
data where ballot order is randomized but identical for every voter. With these data, I
provide new empirical regularities on how such ballot order effects change with the number
of votes available to voters and candidate popularity. I show that these patterns are difficult
to reconcile with existing models in which ballot order directly affects a voter's choices.
In Chapter 2, I propose a novel theory of ballot order effects where rational voters respond
to behavioral voters and then amplify the advantage of candidates listed first due to the
inherent strategic complementarity in voting. My model is an extension of a standard vot-
ing model and allows me to explicitly model the interaction of different types of voters. I
estimate my model using a simulated method of moments and find that the interaction be-
tween voters is empirically important: rational order effects account for around half of total
ballot order effects in terms of vote shares (votes gained just for being listed first), while also
reducing the number of behavioral voters necessary to explain the data in other dimensions
as well. Motivated by these findings, I suggest new policies to address ballot order effects.
In Chapter 3, I investigate how newspaper consumption affects political engagement. To
circumvent potential endogeneity issues, I use variation in European languages as an instru-
ment for newspaper consumption. Specifically, I consider variation in how much physical
space languages require to express some given information content. I first estimate such
language efficiency from large bilingual text compilations. Using a European-wide survey
that spans 18 different languages, I find that respondents who speak efficient languages are
v
more likely to read newspapers, as is consistent with this mechanism. This finding is robust
to a large variety of alternative specifications. Using language efficiency as an instrument for
newspaper consumption, I find that newspaper consumption increases turnout and political
interest of immigrants.
vi
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Chapter 1
Empirical Patterns of Ballot Order Effects
There is evidence that the order in which alternatives are presented can affect how a person
chooses from these alternatives: for example, Jacobs and Hillert [2014] argues that the
alphabetical position of the first letter of a company's name influences its trading activity
in stock markets; or Einav and Yariv [2006] finds that academic success is correlated with
an economist's surname's initial; or the more anecdotal observation that many firms in the
Yellow Pages have names that start with AA or AAA. It is also well known that order
effects are an important feature of elections. A quote from a 1940 U.S. court case reads, It
is a commonly known and accepted fact that in an election [...] those whose names appear at
the head of the list have a distinct advantage.1 Accordingly, 30 US states directly randomize
the ordering of candidates on the voting ballot to minimize these (undesirable) ballot order
effects (BOE) (Miller [2010]). There is also substantial empirical evidence of ballot order
effects in the literature: for example, Ho and Imai [2008] finds ballot order effects substantial
enough to have changed the outcome of 12% of the primary elections studied therein.
While there are some theoretical explanations of ballot order effects using behavioral
models, the majority of the empirical literature has focused on establishing their existence
(Ho and Imai [2008], Miller and Krosnick [1998]) instead of their underlying cause (Meredith
and Salant [2013]). As such, the origin of order effects in elections is still a puzzle. In this
chapter, I try to understand such ballot order effects better. To do this, I first present new
empirical regularities of ballot order effects. I find that these patterns are inconsistent with
the underlying intuition of the leading models in the literature.
1Elliot v. Secretary of State, 294 N.W. 171, 173 (Mich. 1940), as cited in Miller [2010].
2More specifically, I use a data set containing election outcomes of local Californian
elections from 1995 to 2012. In my data, ballot positions are randomly assigned before the
election, but the same for each voter. I first construct the empirical cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of vote shares for each ballot position across all elections in the data. I
then compare the CDFs for candidates listed first on the ballot to the average of the CDFs of
candidates not listed first. Without any order effects, these two CDFs should be identical due
to the randomly determined ballot order. However, I find that in three-candidate elections
where voters may elect one candidate to win (single-vote elections), these two CDFs are not
only different, but they follow a particular pattern:
• Pattern 1: in single-vote elections, the horizontal difference between the two CDFs,
i.e., the difference in vote shares for a given percentile, is lowest for low and very high
vote share percentiles, and largest for intermediate candidates.
I find a similar pattern in four-candidate single-vote elections.
Why is this potentially interesting? Percentiles of vote shares are related to a candidate's
popularity, thus pattern 1 may be interpreted such that unpopular and very popular can-
didates benefit the least from being listed first, while intermediate candidates benefit most.
This can provide some guidance when comparing different models of ballot order effects.
Next, I repeat the analysis for three-candidate elections where voters may elect all but
one candidate in the election (multi-vote election), i.e., voters may vote for two candidates
to elect two winning candidates, for instance voters may vote for two seats on the school
board.
• Pattern 2: in multi-vote elections, the difference in CDFs is relatively constant, i.e.,
similar for all percentiles.
Again, a similar pattern can be found in four-candidate elections with three votes per voter.2
Lastly, I discuss the consistency of other behavioral models of ballot order effects with
the observed empirical patterns. While these do not directly make predictions based on a
2There are not enough elections to conduct the same analysis with five candidates (59) compared to
three-candidate elections (1,899) or four-candidate elections (1,030).
3candidate's vote share percentile, ballot order effects may be correlated with a candidate's
popularity, which itself can be related to a candidate's vote share percentile. As it turns
out, various basic behavioral models where ballot order is used to complete a voter's prefer-
ences are difficult to reconcile with the data. A model where voters gain extra utility when
voting for candidates listed (Miller and Krosnick [1998]) first generates hill-shaped ballot
order effects (pattern 1) but does so for both single-vote elections and multi-vote elections,
and is thus unable to generate the relative flatness of ballot order effects in multi-vote elec-
tions with respect to candidate quality (pattern 2). A search model as in (Meredith and
Salant [2013], Simon [1955], Ho and Imai [2008]) typically implies patterns 1 and 2 for both
candidates listed first and second, which is unlike what we see in the data.
1.1 Literature Review
My study is connected to the literature that investigates the empirical extent of ballot
order effects and the psychological motivation behind it. Parts of my data set stem from
Meredith and Salant [2013] which provides evidence for the existence of ballot order effects
in Californian local elections. This study tests the implications of a theory in which voters
are unsure about their favorite candidate (Satisficing), a prominent theory to explain ballot
order effects. It shows that a simple model of Satisficing cannot alone explain the empirical
pattern based upon a test comparing the advantages of the second-listed candidate and the
third-listed candidate. Related, Ho and Imai [2008] examines Californian state elections
and finds that while ballot order effects are not significant in general elections, they are
influential in primaries and large enough to have changed the election winner in around 12%
of primary elections. Their study considers a cognitive model akin to the Satisficing model.
Last, Miller and Krosnick [1998] studies elections in Ohio and finds ballot order effects of
around 2.5% vote share percentages.
41.2 Empirical Patterns of ballot order effects
In this section, I present my data set and define ballot order effects formally. I investigate
whether there are any regularities of ballot order effects that help us identify their sources.
1.2.1 Data
I use data from the California Elections Data Archive (CEDA), a publicly available collection
of local Californian elections outcomes. These elections determine county supervisors, city
council members, etc., in California's 58 counties and more than 1,100 school and community
college districts.
The CEDA data set that I use includes a total of 9,905 elections from the years 1995
to 2012. Elections are usually held in March or June and in November during even years,
together with the accompanying state-wide elections, and in November during odd years.
Elections vary in their number of candidates m and possible winners and votes per voter w.
Voters can cast as many votes as there are winners in almost all elections in my data set
so I restrict my analysis to these types of elections. All elections are non-partisan, meaning
that candidates are not allowed to state their party affiliation if they have any.
Important for us, the California Secretary of State office randomizes the ordering of
candidates on the ballot roughly 80 days before Election Day (but after candidates decided
to enter): they randomly draw a new alphabet and then order candidates by their names
on all ballots in an election. As an example, if a new alphabet would be drawn to be A C
B instead of A B C, Charlie would be listed before Brown. This random determination
ensures that ballot order is uncorrelated with any characteristic of the candidates.3
In the data, slightly more than half of the elections are school board elections (5,843),
a third are city council elections (3,377), and the remaining elections (853) are for county
or city offices such as mayor, CSD/CSA director, etc. From the raw data set, I excluded
3This is not true randomization, as a candidate named Smith will never be between two Adams, but this
randomization failure would only then be important if candidates responded to it, which is unlikely due to
the small chance of it changing the ordering.
5elections for which I did not have the ordering of candidates (4,102),4 the election data
were incomplete (46), the number of potential winners did not coincide with the number of
votes per voter (228) or the number of votes per voter was equal or higher than the number
of candidates (188). I also exclude runoff elections as they provide potentially different
incentives for voters (1,034)5(Bouton [2013], Bouton and Gratton [2015]) as well as elections
that cross county borders (249).
My data on ballot ordering for the years 1995 to 2008 comes from Meredith and Salant
[2013] where applicable and I collect additional alphabets for the years 2008-2012.6 I assign
ballot ordering manually according to these publicized alphabets, and Meredith and Salant
[2013] shows that assigning ballot order manually matches the actual ballot order 97% of
the time for the San Bernardino County, where discrepancies stem from confusion about
what constitutes the last name of the candidate.
Every ballot contains multiple electoral races. I argue that this reduces the influence of
any single election on whether voters turn out, which I use as justification to assume exoge-
nous turnout in my theoretical model later on. However, salient elections might influence a
voter's turnout decision, so I drop mayoral races as they may drive voters to the polls. Any
remaining differences in turnout are then captured by time or county fixed effects.7
I run my baseline regressions excluding the 5% of elections with the lowest total number
of votes cast (668), i.e., elections with less than 667 total votes. This restriction is motivated
by the theoretical model of strategic voting that I use, which I discuss in more details below.
In a nut shell, if elections are sufficiently large and the chance of a decisive vote diminishes,
the choice of strategic voters can be characterized by relative preferences rather than utilities.
Robustness checks suggest that alternative restrictions provide qualitatively similar results.
4The numbers refer to the amount of elections dropped after the previous step was executed.
5My data set does not explicitly denote which elections are runoff elections but rather indicates in first
round elections whether a candidate proceeded to the second round or potentially could have had. This
allows me to easily distinguish first rounds of runoff elections from plurality elections. The second round
of runoff elections can then be inferred by comparing the set of candidates in two-candidate elections to
elections of the previous election cycle.
6My assignment coincides for all but one election with Meredith and Salant [2013] for the overlapping
year 2008.
7I use month and year dummies in most estimations but do not use their interactions. However, including
them has almost no effect on the regression results.
6Below I present a few summary statistics in table 1.1. Half of all elections are open seat
elections, i.e., without an incumbent running for office, and roughly every third candidate
is an incumbent, while elections have on average 27,023 votes (median 10,082 votes). Table
1.2 displays the number of elections in my data set for the types of elections I use most
frequently.
count mean sd min max
County elections 9237 0.056 0.23 0 1
City elections 9237 0.37 0.48 0 1
School elections 9237 0.58 0.49 0 1
4 year term 9237 0.96 0.19 0 1
Incumbent 42995 0.32 0.47 0 1
Open seat 9237 0.50 0.50 0 1
Odd year elections 9237 0.29 0.45 0 1
Presidential election cycle 9237 0.34 0.47 0 1
Votes for candidates 42995 5805.4 15882.7 2 613376
Total election votes 9237 27023.0 56593.1 668 872335
Year 9237 2004.1 5.35 1995 2012
Number of candidates 9237 4.42 2.38 2 54
Number of votes/winners 9237 2.06 0.86 1 15
Table 1.1: Summary statistics
# of votes per voter/winners # of candidates # of elections
1 2 1, 988
1 3 546
1 4 143
2 3 1, 179
3 4 804
Table 1.2: Number of elections by election type (after excluding small elections)
1.2.2 Total ballot order effects
I now define Ballot Order Effects (BOE) formally. Suppose my data contains |D| elections
where each ballot position k is associated with a vote share τkj in election j. Let τ¯k be the
7average vote share of ballot position k across all |D| elections in the data
τ¯k =
1
|D|
|D|∑
j=1
τkj .
Without any ballot order effects and randomly determined ballot order, all ballot positions
should on average have the same vote share when the number of elections |D| grows large.
This follows directly from the law of large numbers and the independence of ballot order
from any candidate characteristic. Thus, define (unconditional or total) order effects as
the difference between the first position's average vote share and that of the other ballot
positions
b = τ¯1 − 1
m− 1
m∑
k=2
τ¯k.
We could define order effects for any other ballot position as well, but the data suggest that
only the first-listed candidate has consistently an advantage.
Table 1.3 provides a first look at some statistics of the data. I regress whether a candidate
won the election on an indicator of whether a candidate is listed first (and dummies for
election types (m,w)). The first candidate on the list wins 7.43% more elections than other
ballot positions, which is a 12.3% increase in winning chances (1). I also run a similar
regression using vote shares as outcome. On average, the first-listed candidate has a 3.2%
higher vote share than other ballot positions (2). These results are similar to previous
estimates of unconditional order effects (Miller and Krosnick [1998]). In contrast, the second
or third candidate on the ballot does not gain from the ballot ordering in elections with three
or four candidates. In what follows, I will focus on ballot order effects regarding the first-
listed candidate only.
1.2.3 Conditional ballot order effects
Next, I want to explore how ballot order effects change with the popularity of the first
candidate and with how many seats a voter can vote for, fixing the number of candidates
in the election. I will do this by computing a ballot position's CDF over all elections in
8(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Winner Vote share Vote share Vote share
First 7.43*** 3.25*** 2.49*** 2.93***
(0.699) (0.222) (0.666) (0.559)
Second -0.0757 0.773
(0.648) (0.568)
Third 0.836
(0.540)
Election type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of candidates any any 3 4
Observations 40,843 40,843 5,175 7,572
R-squared 0.097 0.506 0.492 0.523
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.3: Overall ballot order effects statistics.
the data.8 This measure will not only relate to popularity but also allow me to compare
popularity across different election types, which is not possible when directly using vote
shares.9
For instance, the solid line in figure 1.1 is the CDF Q1 of the first ballot position.
Similarly, we can also construct the average of the CDFs of all other positions, Qk, k > 1
, which is the dashed line in that figure. Without any ballot order effects, the two CDFs
should be identical. However, I find they are not the same. In order to measure this variation
not captured by unconditional ballot order effects, define a new measure called conditional
ballot order effect. This is defined as the horizontal difference between the CDF of the first
candidate and the average CDF of all the other candidates.
Formally, define for any vote share percentile q the vote share of ballot position k at
8Meredith and Salant [2013] also consider how order effects with vote share percentiles, meanwhile for
different reasons.
9The relationship between vote shares and popularity might differ across elections - a vote share of 50%
is average in a two-candidate election, but quite high in three-candidate elections.
9Figure 1.1: Data, Order Effects by vote share percentile, 3-candidate election, one vote per
voter, one winner
percentile q to be τk(q) so that
q = Qk(τk(q)).
Then, the definition of ballot order effects b(q) conditional on percentile q is
b(q) = τ1(q)− 1
m− 1
m∑
k=2
τk(q).
Conditional order effects b(q) are mapped in figure 1.2 for three-candidate elections with
percentiles on the x-axis for single-vote elections (solid line) and multi-vote elections (dashed
line). Figure 1.3 provides the same graph for four-candidate elections. Without ballot order
effects it must hold that |D| → ∞ ⇒ τ¯k(q) = τ¯k′(q) for all k, k′.
10
Figure 1.2: Data, order effects by vote share percentile, 3-candidate elections.
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Figure 1.3: Data, order effects by vote share percentile, 4-candidate elections.
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Figure 1.4: Data, Difference of order effects between single-vote elections and multi-vote
elections by percentile with 95% confidence bounds, 3-candidate elections.
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1.2.4 Empirical patterns
I first look at the empirical shape of b(q) separately for three-candidate single-vote elections
and multi-vote elections as in figure 1.2. Ballot order effects in single-vote elections seem to
have a large bump that starts around the 50th percentile and that extends to high percentile
levels, while ballot order effects for the remaining percentile values seem more constant. In
contrast, ballot order effects in multi-vote elections seem more level at around 2% for all
percentiles. The endpoints of both graphs are more volatile as vote shares in extreme
percentiles are more spread out so differences between vote shares at these percentiles are
more volatile with finite data.
Using a non-parametric estimation, I find that conditional order effects in three-candidate
single-vote elections are significantly higher than in three-candidate multi-vote elections for
percentiles 64% to 81%, as can be seen in figure 1.4.10
The pattern also seems to exhibit an inverted U-shape for high vote share percentiles,
starting to increase around the 50% percentile and decreasing in the 70% percentiles.
To investigate this inverted U-shape formally, I regress vote share τkj on an interaction
of
• an indicator of whether a candidate k is listed first Fkj in election j,
• a candidate's percentile qkj or squared percentile q2kj , and
• a group indicator gj (single-vote vs. multi-vote elections),
which then comes out to the following regression equation, where I omit the coefficients on
the lower-order interaction terms and controls Ckj ,
τkj = Ckj + Fkj + qkj + q
2
kj + gj
10These regressions use vote shares as observed in the data. In an alternative regression, I rerun this
analysis but partialling out the effects of incumbency from vote shares. The findings are similar. When
including more controls such as time and county dummies, the results become less powerful. I provide tables
in the appendix.
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+ Fkj · qkj + Fkj · q2kj + Fkj · gj + gj · qkj + gjq2kj
+ β1Fkj · qkj · gj + β2Fkj · q2kj · gj + εkj .
Control variables Ckj include dummies for election types, incumbency interacted with elec-
tion type, whether the election is an open seat election (i.e., no incumbent) and year, month,
and county dummies.11 I estimate confidence intervals using the t-percentile bootstrap
method with 2,000 repetitions.
Table 1.4 presents the results. Specification (1) through (3) run the above regression for
elections with three candidates, (4) and (5) for four-candidate elections. The point estimates
of β1 and β2 suggest a hill shape in all specifications.12 As can be seen from figure 1.2, the
difference in three-candidate elections is significantly hill-shaped for higher percentiles - the
estimates of β1 and β2 imply a downturn at around the 75-th percentile (3).13 I conduct
additional robustness tests related to the composition of elections across election types, they
generally confirm the findings here.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES % Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share
β1 Linear term 11.37* 10.88** 16.19*** 15.33** 17.85**
β2 Quadratic term -8.29 -7.50 -18.78*** -15.39** -17.78**
β1 > 0&β2 < 0 Yes Yes Yes*** Yes Yes*
# of candidates 3 3 3 4 4
Excluded percentiles 1% < 50% 1%
Observations 5,139 5,037 2,571 3,804 3,724
R-squared 0.984 0.990 0.992 0.979 0.987
Bootstrapped t-percentile 2,000 repetitions, clustered by election
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.4: Empirical patterns of ballot order effects.
11For this regression, I drop elections that are held in May as there are only very few of these in my data
set.
12To test whether the estimated effects are due to the construction of percentiles, I manually assign a
random ballot ordering (different from the one in the data) and rerun the regressions. However, these
estimates yield insignificant results, supporting the validity of the results presented here.
13This regression uses only for upper half of percentiles. The quadratic function using β1 and β2 has a
downturn around 50%, which is then at 75% for the upper half.
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1.3 Alternative pure boundedly-rational models
So far I presented various empirical regularities of ballot order effects. Now I investigate
whether other, purely behavioral voting models are consistent with these empirical regu-
larities as well. While one can cook up non-rational models compatible with the data, in
this section I consider some plausible behavioral models and derive testable implications
with uncontrived distributional assumptions. As it turns out, these basic behavioral models
are difficult to reconcile with the data which supports the importance of strategic voting in
creating ballot order effects.
I consider three different types of models which differ in the underlying cause of ballot
order effects: Tie-breaking, Satisficing, and a Utility-bump model. In all these models I
assume that the share of strategic voters is zero, 1 − λ = 0. All voters are thus either
behavioral or sincere voters (who always vote according to their preferences). Alternatively,
one could define these models with a positive share of strategic voters who are not aware
of the first candidate's advantage. I provide a formal analysis of these models in the online
appendix.
1.3.1 Tie-breaking model
There are two senses in which a vote might be a tie-breaker : in the exact sense of breaking
indifferences in preferences, and in an approximate sense where the agent breaks ties between
alternatives whose utilities differences are below a certain threshold. I use the term tie-
breaking as referring to the former version, while the latter one is a special case of the
Utility-bump model I consider below. A model where voters are subject to primacy effects
Miller and Krosnick [1998] is similar to the Utility-bump model.
In a Tie-breaking model, voters have preferences that are order-independent and they
vote strictly according to these preferences (sincere voters), but they use the ballot order
to break indifferences in their preferences. Therefore, in this model I assume that two-way
ties happen with positive probability to create order effects.14
14Higher-order ties are assumed to still have zero probability.
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Formally, a tie-breaking behavioral voter with order-independent utility ui = (ui1, ..., uim)
then chooses an action ai ∈ {0, 1}m = A to maximize U(ai)
U(ai) =
∑
aik=1
uyik,
where for any candidate in ballot position j, ui1 = uik implies that u
y
i1 > u
y
ik.
Let me provide some intuition for how ballot order effects in this model look like. First
note that candidates only benefit from being listed first if they get a vote when first on the
ballot and no vote otherwise. In single-vote elections, this means candidates benefit only if
they tie for being the most-preferred candidate of a voter because in that case they get a
vote after the tie is broken in their favor and otherwise only with a 50% chance. Similarly,
in two-vote elections, candidates listed first need to tie for being the second-most-preferred
candidate of a voter to benefit from their ballot position. But candidates who tie more
often for being the second-most preferred candidate have, on average, a lower mean utility
than those candidates that tie for most-preferred candidate. This means that ballot order
effects in single-vote elections are largest for candidates that perform well and in multi-vote
elections for candidates that perform badly. I show a numerical example of this pattern in
figure 1.5.
To test the Tie-breaking model, I regress vote shares τkj on interactions of
• an indicator of whether a candidate k is listed first Fkj in election j,
• a group indicator gj (single-vote vs. multi-vote elections),
• whether candidate's k percentile is in the region with large ballot order effects Hkj =
qkj > 0.5 if gj = 1
qkj < 0.5 if gj = 0
which then leads to the following regression
τkj = α+ β
m− w
m− 1 · gj · Fkj ·Hkj + ...+ εkj .
17
Figure 1.5: Pure Tie-breaking model prediction
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The Tie-breaking model predicts β ≤ 0.
Note that we need to adjust the share of behavioral voters by m−wm−1 : in this model,
behavioral voters vote for the first candidate, but also give w−1m−1 votes to other candidates.
This translates to a bonus for the first candidate of, on average, 1 − w−1m−1 = m−wm−1 from
behavioral voters.
Below in table 1.5, I present the results for three-candidate elections. I find that the
estimate of β is positive and significant, even when excluding the 1% extreme percentiles.
This suggests that a tie-breaking model is difficult to reconcile with the data as ballot order
effects are not large enough for low-performing candidates in multi-vote elections.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES % Vote Share Vote Share
Large BOE -22.05*** -21.18***
(0.429) (0.388)
Share of behavioral voters 4.18*** 4.27***
(0.786) (0.713)
Single-vote election -55.41*** -55.09***
(0.446) (0.431)
Share of behavioral voters × large BOE -0.203 -0.370
(1.088) (1.046)
Share of behavioral voters × single-vote election -2.269** -2.329***
(0.941) (0.874)
Single-vote election × large BOE 46.93*** 45.42***
(0.707) (0.654)
β Single-vote election × First × large BOE 2.750** 2.986**
(1.378) (1.337)
Percentiles ∈ [1%, 99%]
Observations 5,175 5,073
R-squared 0.838 0.855
Clustered (by election) standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: Test of tie-breaking voting models, 3 candidate elections
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1.3.2 Satisficing
A common theory used to explain ballot order effects is called Satisficing (Simon [1955],
Meredith and Salant [2013], Miller and Krosnick [1998]). Here, voters do not gain extra
utility when voting for the candidate listed first. Instead, voters have some fixed aspiration
level when reading the ballot and they start reading it from the top. They vote for the first
candidates to satisfy this aspiration level and, if no candidate satisfies their aspiration level,
they vote for their most-preferred candidates. This mechanism then produces an advantage
for candidates listed early as they are more likely to be considered for a vote.
Due to the way we construct vote share percentiles, it is not directly possible to test the
Satisficing model using the empirical regularities presented before.However, the Satisficing
model implies that not only candidates listed first enjoy an advantage, but also candidates
listed second. A simulation of how ballot order effets look like in the Satisficing model
can be seen in figure 1.6. In these three-candidate elections, the solid blue line represents
the advantage of candidates listed first over those listed second, and the black dashed line
represents the difference between candidates listed second and those listed third. In contrast,
figure 1.7 shows the same statistics in the data. The difference between being listed second
and third is smaller in the data than the respective difference in the simulated Satisficing
model.This suggests that a Satisficing model cannot explain the empirical patterns we find
in the data.15
1.3.3 Utility-bump model
Lastly, I consider a Utility-bump model. Here, behavioral voters vote according to their
order-independent preferences and, importantly, enjoy some utility bump favoring the first-
listed candidate. This model is similar to the Tie-breaking model introduced above, where
first-listed candidates receive an infinitesimal utility bump sufficient to break ties. Thus,
ballot order effects are of similar shape.
15In fact, the empirical test for the Satisficing model is similar to Meredith and Salant [2013], who also
rejected (a basic version of) the model.
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Figure 1.6: Satisficing model prediction, advantage of candidates listed first over candidates
listed second, and advantage of candidates listed second over candidates listed third.
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Figure 1.7: Data, advantage of candidates listed first over candidates listed second, and
advantage of candidates listed second over candidates listed third.
Let η > 0 be the utility bump for the first-listed candidate. Voters choose an action
ai ∈ {0, 1}m = A to maximize U(ai)
U(ai) =
∑
aik=1
uyik,
where uyi (c) = ui(c) + η if y(c) = 1 and u
y
i (c) = ui(c) otherwise. I allow η > 0 to be of any
size.
With a general utility bump that depends on a candidate's or an election's characteristics
one could reproduce almost any shape of ballot order effects in the data. Thus, I need to
put further restrictions on the model: first, let the utility bump η be constant. Next,
I choose a particular distribution for the distribution of mean utilities G(U), namely an
exponential distribution Exp(ν). The exponential distribution allows me to analytically
derive the model's testable implications due to its convenient properties regarding order
statistics (for example, the minimum of two exponentials is exponential as well).
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This testable implication is similar to the one in the tie-breaking model. Therefore,
as seen in table 1.5, the data reject this testable implication. This suggests that a utility
bump model under these assumptions cannot explain the data because it fails to explain the
relative flatness of order effects in multi-vote elections.
1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I establish new empirical regularities of ballot order effects using local
election data from California. I find that ballot order effects change with the number of
votes a voter may give out and the number of candidates in the election. I further discuss
the consistency of other behavioral models of ballot order effects with the observed empirical
patterns. While these do not directly make predictions based on a candidate's vote share
percentile, ballot order effects may be correlated with a candidate's popularity, which
itself can be related to a candidate's vote share percentile. As it turns out, various basic
behavioral models where ballot order is used to complete a voter's preferences are difficult
to reconcile with the data.
1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Proofs: Purely behavioral models
1.5.1.1 Tie-breaking model:
Recall the following assumptions:
Three-way or higher-order ties in preferences have zero probability (but two-way ties
have positive probability).
Assumption 2 F and G are symmetric around their medians and independent of election
type. Median of F is 0 by definition of F as it is symmetric and mean zero.
Assumption 3 Behavioral voters do not abstain.
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Proposition If two-way ties happen with positive probability and under as-
sumptions 2 and 3, the difference in ballot order effects for candidates with high
and low percentiles in single-vote elections is the same as the reverse in multi-vote
elections in the tie-breaking model, i.e.:
B(0,
1
2
; q,m, 1)−B(1
2
, 1; q,m, 1) = B(
1
2
, 1; q,m,m− 1)−B(0, 1
2
; q,m,m− 1).
To prove this, I show that ballot order effects in single-vote elections are simply the mir-
rored ballot order effects of multi-vote elections. I.e., a candidate with some mean utility
U in single-vote elections gets ballot order effects x and a candidate with mean utility
U ′ =U + 2 · (d − U) in multi-vote elections, where d is the median of the mean utility
distribution, also gets ballot order effects of size x. This then directly implies the result.
Proof. Since candidate entry into the election is independent (assumption A), we can treat
an election with m candidates as an election with m− 1 candidates with an m-th candidate
entering. I now introduce some notation relating to order statistics: define Fk,m−1 to be the
distribution of the k-th order statistic of m − 1 independent random variables distributed
according to F . I.e., the distribution of the k-th lowest value of a m − 1 × 1 vector, where
each entry is drawn independently according to F . Similarly, if f is the pdf of F , let fk,m−1
be the pdf of the k-th order statistic of m− 1 independent random variables.
Then, let Hk,m−1 be the CDF of the k − th lowest utility ui of a voter. By definition,
this is a combination of the mean utility distribution G and the idiosyncratic utility shock
distribution F . Now consider a fixed mean utility U of a candidate. Due to the assumption
of independent errors (assumptions B and C), ballot order effects b(U) for a candidate with
mean utility U in an election with m candidates and w votes per voter and k = m− w can
be written as the probability that voter's i utility for the m-th candidate is the same as that
of the candidate with the k-th lowest utility for voter i:
b(U, k) = λ
∫ b
a
hk,m−1(ui) · f(ui − U)dui,
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where the first part denotes the probability that the k − last candidate gets a utility of ui
for voter i and the second term that the candidate with mean utility U gets a utility of
ui for voter i, i.e., that they tie. Remember that three-way or higher-order ties have zero
probability.
Let d be the median of H. The properties of order statistics imply with the assumption
of symmetry of both F and G that hk,m−1(x) = hm−k,m−1(x+ 2 · (d− x)), as it holds that
hk,m−1(x)
hm−k,m−1(x)
=
1−H(x)
H(x)
and hk,m−1 and hm−k,m−1 have the same support [a,b]. Therefore, for any U , define
U ′ = U + 2 · (d− U).
Note that d is also the median of G as the distribution of F has zero mean and, due to its
symmetry, also a median of zero.
We then have that
b(U ′,m− k) = λ
∫ b
a
hm−k,m−1(ui) · f(ui − U ′)dui
= λ
∫ b
a
hk,m−1(ui + 2 · (d− ui)) · f(−ui + U ′)dui
= λ
∫ b
a
hk,m−1(ui + 2 · (d− ui)) · f(−ui + 2 · d− U)dui
= λ
∫ b
a
hk,m−1(−ui + 2 · d) · f(−u+ 2 · d− U)dui
= λ
∫ −a+2d
−b+2d
hk,m−1(vi) · f(vi − U)dvi
where vi = −ui + 2d. Since we assume that G and f are symmetric and independent, it
follows that H is symmetric. Thus, a+ b = 2d, so that then
b(U ′,m− k) = λ
∫ −a+2d
−b+2d
hk,m−1(vi) · f(vi − U)dvi
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= λ
∫ b
a
hk,m−1(vi) · f(vi − U)dvi
= b(U, k).
Note that percentiles and mean utilites are one-to-one related in this behavioral model
because, firstly, behavioral voters are sincere and, secondly, ballot order effects are due to
indifferences in preferences - a candidate with higher mean utility would simply have a
higher utility and thus not need to rely on ballot ordering. Now define the sum of ballot
order effects over percentiles x to x¯ in an election with w votes as, given m,
B(x, x¯;w = 1) =
m− 1
m− w
∫ x¯
x
b(U j)dG(U j(q)).
The result follows from integrating over the support of G.
1.5.1.2 Utility-bump model
Assumption 4: The utility bump η is constant across elections and identical
across all voters.
Proposition Under assumptions 1, 3, 4, and if the distribution of mean utility
G is exponential with parameter ν > 0, it then holds for any η, ν > 0 in the
utility-bump model that in three-candidate elections for sufficiently low σF :
1
2
B(0.5, 1;w = 1)− 1
2
B(0, 1;w = 1)− [2
3
B(0,
1
2
;w = 2)− 1
3
B(
1
2
, 1;w = 2)] < 0.
The proof is similar to the one for a tie-breaking model. However, due to the more compli-
cated nature of an unrestricted utility bump, I need to rely on parametric assumptions for
mean utility distributions.
Proof. With the assumption about behavioral voters' utilities that σF → 0, the composite
distribution of utilities uji is simply the distribution of mean utilities G. Since candidate
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entry into the election is independent, consider an election with m−1 candidates into which
the m-th candidate enters.
Consider a utility bump model where candidates listed first enjoy a utility bump η. A
candidate gains from behavioral voting if the behavioral voter values the candidate below
the w-th candidate without the utility bump, and above the w-th candidate with the utility
bump, where w is the number of votes per voter. To capture the ranking of utilities, define
Fk,m−1 to be the distribution of the k-th order statistic of m − 1 independent random
variables distributed according to F - i.e., the distribution of the k-th lowest value of a
m− 1× 1 vector, where each entry is drawn independently according to F . Similarly, if f is
the pdf of F , let fk,m−1 be the pdf of the k-th order statistic of m− 1 independent random
variables.
Now consider a fixed η and U j of a candidate. Ballot order effects b(U j) in an election
withm candidates and w votes per voter of this candidate are then, with a share of behavioral
voters of λ and assumption B of independent idiosyncratic error terms:
b(U j) = λ[
∫ ∞
0
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i ) · [1− F (uji − U j − η)]duji −∫ ∞
0
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i ) · [1− F (uji − U j)]duji ]
= λ
∫ ∞
0
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i ) · [F (uji − U j)− F (uji − U j − η)]duji
= λ
∫ ∞
0
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i ) · (
∫ 0
−η
f(uji − U j + x))dxduji .
The support of G(U j) can be separated into percentiles, therefore let q be the percentiles
in the range of [x, x¯] (for example, if q = 12 , it would be the median - in our formulation
below, [0, 12 ] would mean that we integrate all values of G(U
j) up until the median). Then,
again for fixed η, we find that ballot order effects for this range are
B(x, x¯, w) =
∫ x¯
x
b(U j(q))dG(U j(q))
= λ(
∫ x¯
x
(
∫ ∞
0
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i ) · [
∫ 0
−η
f(uji − U j(q) + x)]dx)dujidG(U j(q)))
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As all behavioral voters have the same utility for a candidate as the candidate's mean
utility, candidates get ballot order effects of size λ if their mean utility is η or less below the
mean utility of the candidate with the lower mean utility in the election, i.e., this requires
U j ≤ uji ≤ U j + η. This allows us to rewrite
∫ ∞
0
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i ) ·
∫ 0
−η
f(uji − U j + x)dxduji
=
∫ ∞
0
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i )1{U j ≤ uji ≤ U j + η}duji
=
∫ Uj+η
Uj
gm−w,m−1(u
j
i )du
j
i .
(Note that uji = U
j).
We can then use the convenient result for exponential distributions (CDF=1−e−νx) that
the minimum of two independent exponential distributions with parameters ν is exponential
with parameter 2ν. This implies that if g(x, ν) is the pdf of an exponential distribution,
then g1,2(x, ν) = 2 · g(x, 2ν). One can also show that g2,2(x, ν) = g1,2(x, ν) − 2 · g(x, ν). 16
We then get for elections with one vote
B(x, x¯;w = 1) =
∫ x¯
x
b(U j)dG(U j(q))
= λ(
∫ x¯
x
∫ Uj+η
Uj
g2,2(u
j
i , ν)g(U
j(q), ν)dujidU
j(q)),
and similarly for elections with two votes
B(x, x¯;w = 2) =
∫ x¯
x
b(U j)dG(U j(q))
= λd(
∫ x¯
x
∫ Uj+η
Uj
g1,2(u
j
i , ν)g(U
j(q), ν)dujidU
j(q)).
Then, we can compute the following statistic
1
2
B(qτ > 0.5;w = 1)− 1
2
B(qτ < 0.5;w = 1)− [B(qτ < 1
2
;w = 2)−B(qτ > 1
2
;w = 2)],
16 ∂
∂x
(1− e−νx)2 = 2 · (1− e−νx) · (−νe−νx) = −2νe−νx + 2νe−2νx = −2 · g(x, ν) + g1,2(x, ν)
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which, given exponential distributions, evaluates to
1
24
(−5− 12e−2νη(−1 + eνη))
which is negative for any ν > 0 and η > 0, and thus proves the result.
Chapter 2
Strategic Voting and Ballot Order Effects
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, I presented two empirical patterns of ballot order effects using election data
from California. Consider the empirical CDFs of vote shares for candidates listed first and
those for candidates not listed first respectively. Single-vote elections are elections where
voters can give out only one vote, whereas in multi-vote elections they may give out as many
votes as there candidates but one. For three-candidate and four-candidate elections, I found
the following two patterns:
• Pattern 1: in single-vote elections, the horizontal difference between the two CDFs,
i.e., the difference in vote shares for a given vote share percentile, is lowest for low and
very high vote share percentiles, and largest for intermediate candidates.
• Pattern 2: in multi-vote elections, the difference in CDFs is relatively constant, i.e.,
similar for all percentiles.
In order to explain these findings, I construct a model of ballot order effects consisting of
both behavioral and rational voters. Here, rational voters take into account the advantage of
the first-listed candidate due to behavioral voting, and, as they prefer voting for likely win-
ners to prevent wasting their vote, may create ballot order effects themselves. For instance,
consider an election where two candidates A and B are equally desirable, but candidate A
is listed first. As candidate A gains additional votes from behavioral voters, strategic voters
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may opt to vote for candidate A to lower the possibility of wasting their votes.1
My theoretical model extends the widely-used voting model of Myerson and Weber [1993]
to allow for behavioral voters and multi-vote elections. I focus my analysis particularly on
the interaction between behavioral voters and strategic voters. I derive theoretical results
regarding their interplay and use them to explain the data.
Here is a rough intuition for how my model explains the empirical patterns 1 and 2: When
voters only have one vote, w = 1, the vote share bump from behavioral voters can change
whether strategic voters perceive a first-listed candidate as a potential contender, but only
do so if that candidate was neither a sure loser nor a sure winner to begin with, thus creating
pattern 1. In contrast, in elections with multiple votes per voter, the additional votes provide
more freedom to vote not only for potential contenders but also for candidates with little
chances to win. As such, beliefs about who may win the election become less important,
which then implies that strategic voters are less influenced by the effect of behavioral voters
on the election outcome. This leads to lower variability of ballot order effects in multi-vote
elections as observed in pattern 2. In sum, my model suggests that pattern 1 is driven by
rational voters, whereas pattern 2 comes solely from behavioral voters.
Next, I estimate the extent of rational ballot order effects in my model with basic be-
havioral voting. To do so, I make use of the fact that any curvature leading to pattern 1
must come from rational order effects in my model. With this, I find that half of all ballot
order effects are indeed rational. This implies that strategic voters amplify the initially be-
havioral vote share advantage to roughly twice the size in single-vote elections with three or
four candidates. A structural estimation approach using my theoretical model yields similar
results.
An alternative measure of ballot order effects is how often candidates in different ballot
positions win an election. In the data, candidates listed first win substantially more often
than other ballot positions. Simulations of my model suggest that strategic voters have
a substantially larger impact on a candidate's chances to win (five times as large) than
1In my model, behavioral voters always vote for the first candidate on the ballot. My model is robust to
other types of behavioral voting as well.
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behavioral voters as strategic voters only vote for likely winners and thus allow matching
the data better.
These findings point to the potential empirical importance of strategic voting when
considering ballot order effects and show how strategic complementarity in elections can
naturally lead to a rational amplification of behavioral tendencies. It also supplies indirect
evidence of strategic voting. In fact, the take on strategic voting here is different from the
literature as I investigate the interaction between strategic (rational) voting and behavioral
voting.
Furthermore, I also estimate the share of behavioral voters in two-candidate elections, in
which there is no room for strategic considerations, so any ballot order effects must be due
to behavioral voters. This provides an estimate of 2% of behavioral voters in two-candidate
elections, which is comparable to the share of behavioral voters I estimate in elections with
three or four candidates. Moreover, this finding suggests the necessity of behavioral voters
to explain ballot order effects.
Turning to policy, ballot order effects are an external force that arguably distort elec-
tion outcomes. In my data set, 11.4% of the elections that the first candidate wins should
have been won by some other candidate (without ballot order effects). This finding sug-
gests, similarly to other studies, the use of ballots ordered randomly and differently for each
voter. But when ballot order effects are also caused by strategic voters, one can implement
randomization schemes that require fewer ballot orderings while still significantly reducing
order effects. For example, numerical simulations show that by just using two different ballot
orderings, order effects in elections with few candidates are substantially reduced as rational
order effects decrease due to the spreading of behavioral advantages across candidates. Such
cheaper randomization methods are particularly useful in elections where electronic voting
is not available or feasible, for example for vote-by-mail or absentee voting. Adding to the
literature, my results also suggest that some election systems are more prone to ballot order
effects than others: plurality elections may provide more incentives to vote strategically and
therefore increase ballot order effects relative to runoff elections. I provide some suggestive
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empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Moreover, my models provides a rationale
for observing significant ballot order effects even in salient elections where one would expect
behavioral ballot order effects to be fairly small as what matters for strategic voters is their
perception of the first candidate's advantage.
2.2 Literature review
There is one study that connects strategic voting to ballot order effects, namely the exper-
imental study Forsythe et al. [1993]. Their study tests how strategic voters coordinate in
elections and it allows for the possibility that strategic voter use ballot order as a coordina-
tion device. However, it concludes that the relationship is not strong enough to be identified
in their experimental setting.
My study differs from other studies in the empirical literature in that I am concerned
with the interaction of strategic voting and behavioral voting, whereas most studies are
interested in either one of the two aspects separately. However, there are various empirical
studies that identify strategic voting by looking at elections that provide different incentives
to vote strategically, which is similar to the identification method used here. For example,
Fujiwara et al. [2011] uses a regression discontinuity in the vote system assignment in Brazil
to show that third place candidates are more often deserted in plurality elections than in
runoff-elections, as hypothesized by strategic voting models. Similarly, Cox [1994] considers
Japanese elections, in which voters have one vote, but candidates run for more than one seat
simultaneously. It derives testable implications of the equilibrium results for these multi-
winner elections, namely that trailing and leading candidates will be deserted, and finds
that the data indeed support this strategic voting prediction. Kawai and Watanabe [2013]
directly estimates the share of strategic voters in Japanese general elections using a structural
estimation. It uses variation of preferences along observable characteristics and election
outcomes both within and across counties to identify strategic voting in their study and finds
a large share of voters, roughly three out of four voters, to be strategic. Likewise, Degan and
33
Merlo [2009] considers the possibility of identifying non-sincere voting2 in individual-level
data and shows that such identification of strategic voting requires multiple observations of
voter behavior. With regard to my model, I observe a given voter only once in my data
(or at least I cannot assign them to more than one election). However, I can still identify
non-sincere voting as voting exhibits a correlation between vote share and ballot order which
cannot be explained by sincere voting alone.
On the theory side, I derive my theoretical model from Myerson and Weber [1993],
which derives voting equilibria as the set of solutions in which voters believe that only the
top two contenders have a reasonable chance of winning. Like my model, that model does
not use rational expectations. I extend this model by allowing for behavioral voters and
elections with multiple votes per voter. This enables me to look at the interaction between
these two types of voters and investigate what theoretical implications this interplay has.
Contrarily, Myerson [1998, 2000] defines a completely rational model of voting games, in
which the uncertainty about the election outcome stems from uncertainty about the number
of voters who participate in the election. This turns out to have comparable properties to
my preferred model.
Lastly, my study is also related to various studies on behavioral biases in political envi-
ronments. Bisin et al. [2015] investigates how rational actors (politicians) respond to voters
suffering from self-control problems, leading to an amplification of the behavioral bias of
voters. This amplification mechanism is similar to the one I study as it comes from rational
agents (in my case, rational voters) responding to the behavioral tendencies of voters. Levy
and Razin [2015] considers voters who are oblivious of a possible correlation between their in-
formation sources (correlation neglect) and thus put too much weight on information gained
from others rather than their own political convictions, which can, under certain conditions,
lead to better information aggregation. In an empirical context, Ortoleva and Snowberg
[2015] investigates the connection between overconfidence in one's opinion and various po-
litical variables of interest and finds that overconfidence has indeed strong predictive power
2Here, I use sincere voting to mean voting according to one's order-independent preferences.
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with regard to these variables.
2.3 Model
I now construct a model of both behavioral and rational (strategic) voters. I first define the
underlying model notation and the concept of a voting equilibrium. I then provide intuition
for the consistency of my model with the empirical regularities presented in the previous
section, while a formal analysis can be found in an online appendix. I then estimate the
relative importance of behavioral ballot order effects and strategic ballot order effects in this
model in the next section.
2.3.1 Environment
An election consists of m candidates and w possible winners, where m > w ≥ 1.3 These
m candidates are listed according to a randomly determined ballot ordering y which is
identical for all voters in an election. Voters may cast up to w ≥ 0 votes4 (including 0,
i.e. abstaining) but no more than one vote for any candidate. Every vote counts equally
and the w candidates with the most votes win the election, while ties are broken with
equal probability. There are N voters who participate in the election, where I assume, as is
common in the literature, that N is sufficiently large so we can make use of the law of large
numbers. All voters vote simultaneously without prior communication. Voting is costless
which implies that turnout is exogenous5 and the set of voters that turn out are randomly
drawn from the pool of potential types.
A voter's type consists of two elements: a voter's utility u for candidates and a voter's
type θ, either behavioral or strategic.6 I assume that u and θ are independent of each other
3Note that w > 1 is possible, for example in school board elections, when two seats on the board are up
for the taking.
4Throughout I assume that voters can give out as many votes as there are possible winners. This is
simply because my data set mostly consists of such elections.
5I justify this by that there are multiple elections on each ballot, which arguably reduces the importance
of any given election on the turnout decision.
6I do not model sincere voters, i.e., voters who always vote according to order-independent preferences.
These voters never create any ballot order effects and are thus not directly important for the qualitative
analysis here. However, I consider sincere voters later on when I estimate the model.
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and denote by λ the probability of a voter being behavioral. I assume that λ is fixed
throughout all elections.7 A voter's type (u, θ) is private information, but the distributions
of types are publicly known.
Denote the m candidates in the election by C ={c1, ..., cm}. Let ui : C → Rm be
the vector of utilities that voter i gains from having some candidate win the election. I
assume that voters are not indifferent between candidates. Let there be a mean utility U j
(or candidate quality) for every candidate j across all voters i (with some type (u, θ)). A
candidate's mean utility is a draw from the distribution of mean utilities G(U). We can
write the utility uij of a given voter i for candidate j to be
uij = Uj + εij
with εij as some individual utility shock and F (ε; c) as the mean-zero distribution of ε =
(ε1, ..., εm) with standard deviation σF (c).
To begin with, I provide a few assumptions about utilities that will simplify the following
analysis. First, I assume that candidates enter independently of each other, which abstracts
away from potential median voter considerations and candidate positioning. As my study
is concerned with the behavior of voters rather than that of candidates, my results are thus
not intended to account for strategic considerations of candidates. Moreover, I assume that
a voter's idiosyncratic error terms are iid draws for all candidates. Further, I assume that
the distributions F (ε) and G(U) are continuous and bounded.
Next, the two types of voters differ both in the nature of their preferences and how they
translate these into votes:
A behavioral voter simply votes for the first-listed candidate. Let uyi : C × Y → Rm be
the order-dependent utility of a voter for candidates. A behavioral voter then chooses an
action ai ∈ {0, 1}m = A to maximize U(ai)
7Simulations show that a purely behavioral model where the share of behavioral voters differs by election
cannot easily be reconciled with the data.
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U(ai) =
∑
aij=1
uyij ,
where the j − th entry of ai equals one if voter i votes for candidate j and the sum of votes
cannot exceed w,
∑m
j=1 aij ≤ w. I assume that behavioral voters always vote for the first
candidate and randomly vote for other candidates when they have more than one vote, i.e.,
uyi (c) = ∞ if y(c) = 1 and uyi (c) = c if y(c) 6= 1 where c are finite, positive random
numbers drawn from i.i.d. continuous distributions.8'9'10
Strategic voters maximize expected utility combining an order-independent utility and
beliefs about the election outcome. Denote by p(ck|ai) the probability that candidate ck
wins given voter i choosing action ai, where aik = 1 if voter i votes for candidate k and
aik = 0 if not, and it holds that
∑
k aik ≤ w. The expected utility can then be written as
U˜i(ai) =
∑
k≤m
p(ck|ai) · uik.
A voter only cares about how her votes change her expected utility. Let pi(ck, cj) be the
perceived pivot probability of the event in which candidates ck and cj have the same number
of votes or ck has one vote less than cj , and they would then tie for the last winning spot.
Note that only when these events occur, a single vote may decide the election. I assume
that pi(ck, cj) = pi(cj , ck) as is common in the literature.11 I further assume that the pivot
8A model in which there are only rational voters whose preferences are affected by ballot order yields
different results than my model here. For example, ballot order effects would not exist if the first-listed
candidate has no chances of winning, which is not found in the data. In contrast, a model in which there
are both types of voters but rational voters may also be affected by ballot order is simply a generalization
of my model.
9Alternatively, one could assume that behavioral voters either vote for the first w candidates on the list
(i.e., in a two-candidate election behavioral voters vote for the first two candidates on the list), implying
uyi (c) = ∞ when y(c) ≤ w, or that they only vote for the first-listed candidate, uyi (c) = −∞ for y(c) > 1,
or that they have order-independent preferences regarding any candidate but the first-listed candidate. All
models are compatible with (a slightly adjusted version of) my main theoretical theorem.
10In the data, I find that the first candidate enjoys a significant advantage over the second candidate even
in those elections where strategic voting seems fairly marginal, and, moreover, the second candidate does
not do significantly better than the third candidate in elections with 3 candidates and 2 votes per voter.
This suggests that the alternative where behavioral voters vote for the first w candidates on the ballot seems
inconsistent with the data.
11This is approximately satisfied if the number of voters becomes sufficiently large, Myerson and Weber
[1993].
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probability of any three-way or higher-order tie is perceived to be zero.12 Henceforth, when
I refer to pivot probabilities I mean a function of a candidate pair. Random draws of the
N voters with types consisting of utility and behavioral type prevent certainty about the
election outcome and as such necessitate the use of probabilities.
The maximization problem of voters can then be rewritten using pivot probabilities: in
elections with a single vote per voter w = 1, voter i chooses ck given pivot probabilities p
to maximize:
u˜i(ck|p) =
∑
cj∈C
pi(ck, cj) [uik − uij ].
This generalizes to elections with more than one vote w > 1, where strategic voters vote for
a w-subset of candidates to maximize u˜i(ai|p)
u˜i(ai|p) =
∑
aij=1
∑
cj∈C
pi(ck, cj) [uik − uij ] =
∑
aij=1
u˜i(ck|p),
This encompasses strategic abstention if the number of candidates voted for is less than w.
2.3.2 Voting equilibrium
To close the model, I need to define consistency conditions between beliefs (pivot proba-
bilities) and the equilibrium outcomes. My definition of a voting equilibrium extends the
commonly used model of Myerson and Weber [1993] to elections with multiple winners and
votes per voter and augments it with behavioral voters. As in that model, I do not use
rational expectations when specifying the equilibrium. Instead, I only require that beliefs
satisfy some consistency conditions with respect to the expected ex-post vote share ranking
as outlined below. This is to capture the intuitive idea that voters do not go through com-
plicated pivot probability and utility computations but rather use the expected vote share
ranking of candidates to proxy which candidates may win. Moreover, despite my model's
simplicity, most results derived here only depend on typical strategic voting characteristics
such as the abandoning of weak candidates and the milder restrictions of strategic voting
12This is analogous to Myerson and Weber [1993].
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in elections with multiple votes. This suggests that the qualitative results are robust to
the choice of the specific voting model as long as they exhibit these features. Also, such
a condensed model facilitates exposition and presents more clearly the connection between
the theoretical results and the empirical analysis.
To define the concept of a voting equilibrium, let me provide a couple of definitions first.
Recall that the uncertainty in our model comes from Nature randomly drawing a set of
voters to participate in the election. Then, for a given draw s of voters, let tk(s) be the vote
share of candidate k given the set of actions of all voters in the election given draw s
tk(s) =
∑
i≤N aik,s∑m
l=1
∑
i≤N ail,s
· w.
I multiply by w so that if a candidate gets a vote from every voter, her vote share is 100%.
13
The objective uncertainty about the composition of voters in the election induces an
election to be a distribution over election outcomes tj(s), one for each random draw s. In
contrast, there will be only one expected vote share
τ(k) = E[ts(k)].
The upcoming consistency conditions between pivot probabilities and the equilibrium out-
come are thus defined with respect to the expected vote share τ rather than any specific
election outcome tk(s). In what follows, I therefore often refer to the expected vote share τ
as vote share and omit the term expected.
Less interested readers may now skip to the definition of the voting equilibrium after
which I illustrate how strategic voting works in this model.
Recall that pivot probabilities denote the probability of a vote deciding the election
between two candidates. Accordingly, every candidate pair is assigned a pivot probability.
13Note that vote shares can exceed 100% in multi-vote elections with w > 1 if some voters abstain and
one candidate garners more than 1
w
of all votes.
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The first consistency condition states that for every winning candidate there is another
candidate with whom the candidate has a non-zero pivot probability. In effect, it means
that there exists some uncertainty in the election, i.e., it is not pre-decided. This implies
that voters will not vote for their least preferred candidates just because their vote does
not matter (i.e., elimination of weakly dominated strategies). It also implies that strategic
voters will vote sincerely, i.e., according to their preferences, in elections with two candidates,
which in turn prevents any ballot order effects from strategic voters in these elections.
(Uncertainty condition):
If τ(cj) is among the w-highest vote shares τ , there exists some ck ∈ C such that
for all i
pi(cj , ck) > 0.
The next condition is analogous to Myerson and Weber [1993] in single-vote elections, and
I extend it to multi-vote elections. To explain its intuition, consider an election where only
candidate may win and there are three candidates A, B, and C. Suppose that τA > τB > τC ,
i.e., A and B are expected to rank first and second respectively. Voters are uncertain about
who will win, but it seems natural to believe that the two candidates most likely to tie for first
place are A and B. Thus, Myerson and Weber [1993] requires that in equilibrium, the pivot
probability for these two candidates is larger than any other pivot probability. Reflecting
that they are concerned with large elections, Myerson and Weber [1993] assumes that the
pivot probability p(A,B) is in fact one magnitude larger than any other pivot probability.
Consequently, voters only maximize utility over these two candidates in equilibrium.
I want to carry over this intuition to the case when voters have multiple votes and
there are multiple winners. So suppose now that in the election with A, B, and C and
τA > τB > τC , two candidates may win. Now what matters to voters is not whether a
candidate places first or second but rather second or third. In this election, this would be
most likely for candidates B and C.
These examples illustrate the notion of competing candidates which is formalized below.
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In our first example, consider candidate A who is most likely to win the election. However,
amongst the remanining candidates, the candidate with whom she is most likely to tie
for first place is B. Therefore, we will say A's competing candidate is B. Similarly, B's
competing candidate is A because the scenario in which she ties with A for the win is more
likely than the scenario in which she ties with C. Lastly, C's competing candidate is also A
- although candidate C is more likely to tie with B than A, she is more likely to tie for a
win with candidate A than B.14'15 In the second example, by a similar logic, A's competing
candidate is C (because now the tie for the win is a tie for second place), B's competing
candidate is C, and C's competing candidate is B. Notice that competing candidates are
not necessarily symmetric.
To capture this formally, define r : C × τ → {1, ...,m} to be the ranking of candidates
in terms of their expected vote share τ . If r(cj) is less than r(ck), it means that cj has
a higher expected vote share than ck. Suppose there are no ties in vote share rankings.16
Then define for any candidate ck the competing candidate opp(ck) by
opp(ck) = cj s.t.

r(cj) = w, if r(ck) > w,
r(cj) = w + 1, if r(ck) ≤ w.
Now, to preserve the nature of the condition in Myerson and Weber [1993], I require that
in equilibrium, voters perceive the pivot probability with their competing candidates to be
one magnitude larger than with any other candidate. Thus, formally, for any M ≥ 1 define
the following condition:17
14Notice that the scenario where C ties B for the win involves both B and C beating A, which seems
likely.
15I stated a few assumptions already that exclude the possibility of correlations between pivot probabilities
coming from preferences.
16I consider ties in the vote share rankings in the appendix.
17Similar to our model, the equilibrium notion in Myerson and Weber [1993] requires this condition for
arbitrarily large M . So does Myerson [2000] when the number of voters becomes sufficiently large (which is
also one possible interpretation of this condition). Contrarily, Kawai and Watanabe [2013] assume a weaker
condition requiring only M = 1.
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(M-pivot probability condition): For all candidates ck ∈ C,
p(ck, opp(ck)) ≥M · p(ck, c), for any candidate c ∈ C \ {ck, opp(ck)}.
If there are multiple competing candidates of a candidate, then
p(ck, opp(ck)) = p(ck, opp(ck)
′) for competing candidates opp(ck), opp(ck)′.
Recall that in the first example, B was the competing candidate of A because A is more likely
to tie for first place with B than with C. The M-pivot probability condition requires that
pivot probabilities respect this ordering and, in particular, we should have that p(A,B) 
p(A,C) - the condition in fact requires a little more, it requires that the probabilities differ
by a order of magnitude. Similarly, we had that A was the competing candidate of C, which
then implies that p(C,A)  p(C,B). In the example with two winners, we find with a
similar logic that p(B,C) p(A,C) and p(A,C) p(B,C).
The two conditions introduced above are defined by inequalities, so there are multiple sets
of pivot probabilities of p that may satisfy these. Hence, to avoid unnecessary multiplicity
of equilibria, I define an equilibrium in terms of the actions chosen by the types in the game
rather than by the combination of actions and pivot probabilities. This reduces the set of
equilibria in the elections that are relevant for our analysis (single-vote elections and multi-
vote elections with m = w + 1), as in those, for sufficiently large M , equilibrium actions in
response to the set of pivot probabilities will converge towards a unique set.
Voting equilibrium:
The voting profile a is a voting equilibrium if there exist pivot probabilities p(u, θ) such
that for each voter type (u, θ)
• voters choose actions a to maximize their expected utility given their pivot probabilities
p(u, θ), and
• p satisfies:
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 the uncertainty condition and
 the M-pivot probability condition for all M > M¯ ≡ maximax(j,k)|uij−uik|minimin(j,k)|uij−uik| (m− 1).
The existence of such voting equilibria is proven in the appendix.
To provide an example of an equilibrium, consider an election with three candidates
A, B, and C and let there be one vote per voter and one potential winner. Now suppose
that candidate A is listed first and consider a set of τ for which τA > τB > 0 and τC =
0. In particular, let τA be the proportion of voters who prefer A over B (which includes
behavioral voters) and τB those who prefer B over A. Define pivot probabilities such that
p(A,B) = 1 and p(A,C) = 0 and p(B,C) = 0 and p(A,B,C) = 0. These pivot probabilities
satisfy the equilibrium conditions as is easy to check. Then, all voters, both strategic and
behavioral, will only vote for the top-two candidates, which then generates τ . Therefore, the
corresponding action profile is an equilibrium, and in this equilibrium the respective vote
share and pivot probabilities are given by τ and p.
I am concerned with two types of elections in this chapter: 1. single-vote elections with
m > w = 1 and 2. multi-vote elections where the number of candidates is one larger than the
number of votes available to voters, m = w+ 1. Suppose there are no ties in the vote share
rankings (which happen with probability zero given our model set-up).18 Our definition of
a voting equilibrium then implies a specific choice procedure of strategic voters for these
types of elections. Specifically, it implies that consideration of some candidate pairs swamps
the entire decision because of the difference in magnitudes for pivot probabilities. So, when
considering their first vote, strategic voters behave as if the only candidates that exist in the
election are the ones with the highest pivot probabilities. When considering the second vote,
they look at the pair with the second-highest pivot probability. This leads to the following
algorithm:
This algorithm takes as example some strategic voter i. Recall that w denotes the number
of winners in an election and the number of votes a voter may give out. Consider some τ and
18I discuss the definition of this algorithm when there are ties in the appendix.
43
its implied vote share ranking r; for simplicity, suppose that τ(c1) > τ(c2) > ... > τ(cm).
The algorithm is then as follows for single-vote elections:
(Strategic) Voting algorithm [single vote]:
1 Vote for candidate c1 if uic1 > uic2 . Vote for candidate c2 if uic1 < uic2 .
2 Stop.
Consider the example of τA > τB > τC with only one winner. Step 1 of the algorithm then
implies that voters vote for candidate A if uiA > uiB and for B otherwise. Voters will never
vote for candidate C (which implies that τC = 0 if C is not listed first).
Note that candidate cw is the lowest-ranked expected winning candidate and candidate
cw+1 is the highest-ranked expected losing candidate (they are also the competing candidates
of each other). The voting mechanism for multi-vote elections is as follows:
(Strategic) Voting algorithm [multiple votes]:
1 Vote for candidate cw if uiw > uiw+1. Vote for candidate cw+1 if uiw < uiw+1.
2 Vote for candidate cw−1 if uiw−1 > uiw+1.
3 If w = 2, stop. If w > 2, vote for candidate cw−2 if uiw−2 > uiw+1.
4 If w = 3, stop. If w > 3, vote for candidate cw−3 if uiw−3 > uiw+1.
5 ....
Consider the example of τA > τB > τC with two winners and two votes. Step 1 implies that
voters vote for candidate cB if uiB > uiC and for C otherwise. Then, continuing to step 2,
the voter votes for candidate cA if uiA > uiC . Then stop.
2.3.3 Mechanisms in the model
In this part, I convey the intuition for how rational order effects vary with a candidate's
popularity.
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i first\i not first Out In
Out No rational order effects −
In Rational order effects No rational order effects
Figure 2.1: Rational order effects as a function of whether a candidate is in the running
2.3.3.1 Single-vote elections
Let us first consider single-vote elections, in which voters give out one vote and only one
candidate may win the election. Specifically, consider an election with three candidates A,
B, and C and consider a strategic voter who prefers A  B  C. Let the strategic voter's
votes v be v = (vA, vB, vC) where vk = 1 if the strategic voter votes for candidate k and
vk = 0 if not. This voter's contribution to order effects of candidate k is then
b(k) = vk(k listed first)− vk(k not listed first).
Recall that in equilibrium, in single-vote elections, strategic voters maximize their utility
only between the top-two candidates given the expected vote share ranking as this is the
candidate pair with the highest pivot probability. For notational ease, say that in single-vote
elections, the two-highest ranked candidates with respect to τ are in the running. I now
consider multiple cases that differ in whether the first-listed candidate is in the running and
show that rational order effects exist when behavioral voters change whether a candidate
is in the running. The matrix in figure 2.1 summarizes these cases. I will spell out in the
online appendix how this mechanism gets translated into the data, but, intuitively, we would
expect a candidate that is out of the running to have a low vote share and thus be among the
candidates with a low percentile; conversely, candidates who are in the running regardless
of being listed first are those in the high percentiles.19
(Out/Out): First consider candidate A and suppose candidate A is not in the running
both when listed first and when not listed first (low percentile). This means that our
strategic voter will not vote for candidate A in either case. Thus, her vote does not depend
19Note that the Out/In case is not possible because behavioral voters only provide additional support to
the first-listed candidate.
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on the ballot ordering, v(A listed first) = v(A not listed first) = (0, 1, 0) as A  B  C.
Therefore,
b(A) = vA(A listed first)− vA(A not listed first) = 0,
so there are no rational order effects.
(In/In): Next, let candidate A be in the running both when listed first and when not
listed first (high percentile). This means that our strategic voter will vote for A in both
cases, v(A listed first) = v(A not listed first) = (1, 0, 0). Therefore, her vote will again not
depend on the ballot ordering
b(A) = vA(A listed first)− vA(A not listed first) = 0,
which again implies that there will be no rational order effects.
(In/Out): But now suppose that candidate A is not in the running when not listed first,
but in the running when listed first (intermediate percentiles), so behavioral voters provide
enough support to push candidate A to be among the top-two candidates. In this case, the
strategic voter does not vote for candidate A when A is not listed first, v(A not listed first) =
(0, 1, 0) as A  B  C, but does so when A is listed first v(A listed first) = (1, 0, 0) as
A  B  C. This means her vote depends on the ballot ordering,
b(A) = vA(A listed first)− vA(A not listed first) = 1.
We may thus observe rational order effects for these candidates. We have shown the results
provided in matrix in figure 2.1.
In summary, in single-vote elections, behavioral order effects are flat while rational order
effects are inverted U-shaped as a function of a candidate's popularity. This would explain
the empirical pattern in single-vote elections of the previous section.
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2.3.3.2 Multi-vote elections
Next, consider elections where voters can vote for all candidates but one, i.e., w = m − 1.
How do rational ballot order effects look like in multi-vote elections? Note that strategic
voters base their vote on whether they like a candidate and on whether the candidate is likely
to win. In multi-vote elections, where the number of candidates exceeds the number of votes
per voter by just one, voters have enough votes to vote for all candidates they like. Thus,
there is no need to coordinate and voters essentially vote according to their preferences.
And because strategic voters have, by definition, order-independent preferences, strategic
ballot order effects will be small in these elections. This stands in contrast to single-vote
elections where candidates may be considered out of the running and thus be unattractive.
Nevertheless, despite voters having enough votes to vote for all candidates but their
least-preferred one, it is still possible for strategic ballot order effects to exist due to changes
in what pairs of candidates voters compare to each other: For example, consider an election
with three candidates A,B, and C. Suppose that when B is not listed first, we have that
τA > τB > τC , and when B is listed first it holds that τB > τA > τC . Recall that voters
follow a sequential voting algorithm in my model, so they first maximize utility over the
two lowest-ranked candidates (as there are two winners in this election) and then vote for
the highest-ranked candidate if and only if that candidate is preferred to the last-ranked
candidate. This means that if B is not listed first, voters first compare (B,C), vote for either
B or C depending on whether B  C or not, and then vote for A if A  C. But in the latter
case, they first compare (A,C) and vote for either A or C depending on A  C or not, and
then vote for B if B  C. While both A and B are compared to the same candidate and
thus get the same number of votes in both cases, candidate C is once compared to candidate
A and once to candidate B and may thus receive a different amount of votes dependent on
the ballot ordering, which may then lead to rational order effects.20
20Note that for this case to happen, the vote shares of A and B must be sufficiently close. This in turn
means that the difference in being compared to A or B will also be fairly similar. This can be used to show
that rational order effects in multi-vote elections are generally bounded above by the share of behavioral
voters.
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While we cannot exclude the possibility of rational ballot order effects in multi-vote
elections, I show formally in an online appendix that this effect can be made small under
some conditions. Moreover, under these conditions, rational order effects in single-vote
elections will still exist and exhibit the pattern as discussed above.
In summary, in multi-vote elections, behavioral order effects are flat as function of a
candidate's popularity while rational order effects are under some conditions close to zero.
This would explain the empirical patterns in multi-vote elections of the previous section.
2.3.3.3 Numerical example
The next figure 2.2 presents a numerical illustration of the intuition presented before. To
generate this figure, I simulate elections as described further below in the next subsection.21
It showcases the characteristics of strategic ballot order effects: for low enough percentiles,
ballot order effects in single-vote elections are zero and rise at percentiles of around a third.22
From thereon, the advantage continues to rise until percentiles of around two thirds and
decreases afterwards. In contrast, ballot order effects in multi-vote elections are relatively
more constant with only a small drop at low percentiles.
2.4 Empirical evaluation
I now use my model to quantify rational ballot order effects. I first do this for ballot order
effects defined in terms of vote shares, I then investigate the first candidate's advantage in
terms of elections won.
21In this simulation, the share of behavioral voters is lower in multi-vote elections than in single-vote
elections. This is necessary to generate the overlap of order effects for low percentiles - other, purely
behavioral models that I consider require this as well. This is because behavioral voters give out all their w
votes in multi-vote elections, so a given share of behavioral voters creates larger order effects in single-vote
elections. Alternatively, one could generate this overlap in my model with identical shares of behavioral
voters if they were to only give out one vote even if they had multiple votes.
22The little spike in single-vote elections around 0.35 is because candidates not listed first cannot have
a vote share less than λ/(1 − λ) as otherwise the first candidate will overtake them (if not already ranked
first). This spike in the figure is thus due to non-first vote shares jumping from zero to λ/(1− λ).
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Figure 2.2: Num. example of order effects in model, 3-candidate elections.
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2.4.1 Summary
In the previous section about empirical patterns, we saw that the data exhibits a particular
shape with respect to conditional order effects, specifically it seems to be inverted U-shaped
in single-vote elections, but constant in multi-vote elections. In the previous section, I
provided a theory that suggests that behavioral order effects are flat, and that rational
order effects are inverted U-shaped in single-vote elections and may be close to zero in
multi-vote elections. Taken together, the theory suggests that the empirical inverted U-
shape for single-vote elections is the sum of flat behavioral and inverted U-shaped rational
order effects. For multi-vote elections, it is the sum of flat behavioral order effects and close
to zero rational order effects.
I will now estimate my model. My empirical analysis can be broken down in three parts,
with my main results as follows:
1. Strategic order effects account for half of all ballot order effects in terms of vote shares.
2. Strategic order effects have a more than 5 times larger impact on who wins the election
compared to behavioral order effects.
3. Policy where we distribute two differently ordered ballots substantially reduces
order effects when strategic order effects are present.
2.4.2 Estimation of rational order effects - vote shares
I estimate the size of rational order effects in two ways. The first method is described here,
the second method is more structural and is described further below. Both methods provide
similar results.
Method 1: In my model, behavioral voters do not create a relationship between per-
centiles q and conditional order effects b(q).23 But as seen in the previous section, rational
23If one were to assume different (or more sophisticated) behavioral theories, my quantitative estimates
of strategic ballot order effects could change as a result - in both directions, up or down. One could use
estimation strategies similar to the tests implemented in the following section to allow for more sophisticated
behavioral voting.
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order effects create an increase in order effects b(q) for high vote share percentiles q.24 Since
I do not observe the percentile cutoff for where rational order effects exist, I need to estimate
this cutoff. I do this by estimating the percentile cutoff beyond which e conditional order
effects become hill-shaped, as that shape can only be caused by rational order effects. I then
compare order effects on both sides of the cutoff to estimate a lower bound on rational order
effects.
To do this, I first run a regression of vote share on various controls such as incumbency,
month, year, and county dummies, whether the election is an open seat election (no incum-
bent), and whether the office is for 4 years or shorter. After partialling out the effects of
these controls on vote share τkj ,25 I compute conditional order effects b(q) using the adjusted
vote shares. However, to compute b(q) directly, I need to discretize q into 100 bins.
I first run a non-linear least-squares estimation where I estimate a cutoff q¯ given the
following equation
b(q) = (a0 + a1q + a2q
2) · 1{q < q¯}+ (a′0 + a′1q + a′2q2} · 1{q ≥ q¯}.
Given the estimate of q¯, I then compute the difference β in order effects between percentiles
below and above this cutoff using the regression equation
b(q) = β · 1{q ≥ q¯}+ ε.
My estimate of rational order effects is then β · (1 − q¯).26 I estimate standard errors by
bootstrapping this procedure 1,000 times.
Table 2.4.2 lists the results. I estimate the cutoff to be around the 50-th percentile for
most specifications (1) - (3). Rational order effects are 1.29%∗ in my main specification (1),
24Since rational order effects decrease for very high vote share percentiles in my model, this method would
provide a lower bound on rational order effects.
25I only do this for the dependent variable, as the independent variable is binary and I use it to construct
ballot order effects. However, no regressors are significant when regressing ballot position on the control
variables.
26Alternatively, one could use the estimated coefficients of the first stage to estimate strategic order effects,
which yields very similar results.
51
which accounts for 48%∗ of all order effects. Similarly, I find a share of 1.4% behavioral
voters, which is very similar to what I estimate in the structural estimation below. The
estimates change little when also using smaller elections with at least 196 votes (2), when
using only school-related elections (3), or when considering the difference between single-
vote and multi-vote elections to determine the cutoff. However, I estimate a substantially
different cutoff value for elections other than school elections, which then leads to different
estimates of rational order effects as well (4).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES % Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share
β · q¯: Strategic order effects 1.29* 1.24* 1.57* 0.69 1.47*
(0.757) (0.749) (0.926) (0.793) (0.821)
Strategic share 48* 46* 57** 23 54**
(25.4) (24.5) (28.5) (20.6) (26.6)
λ: Behavioral order effects 1.40 1.46 1.18 2.31** 1.23
(0.889) (0.916) (1.092) (1.057) (0.860)
q¯: Cutoff 52** 54** 43 77*** 56**
(25.44) (24.47) (28.54) (20.61) (27.14)
Scenario Voters > 196 School elections No school +multi-vote elections
Excluded 1% and 100% Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,638 1,701 1,008 630 5,175
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Method 2: I use the theoretical model described in the previous section to estimate the
size of rational order effects in three-candidate and four-candidate single-vote and multi-vote
elections. To do this, I first draw mean utilities for candidates U from a standard normal
distribution U ∼ N(0, 1). Given these mean utilities, I use a logit model to determine how
many voters prefer a candidate with mean utility Uj over a candidate with mean utility Uk,
P (uij > uik) =
exp(Uj/µ)
exp(Uj/µ) + exp(Uk/µ)
,
where µ denotes the scale parameter of the logit distribution.
I use the relationship between P (·) and U to compute vote shares. Recall that in single-
vote elections, strategic voters only maximize utility between the top-two candidates. It is
thus sufficient to define preferences over candidate pairs to determine strategic vote shares.
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Behavioral voters always vote for the first-listed candidate, their behavior does not depend
on the preference distribution in single-vote elections.
As before, let λ denote the share of behavioral voters. I use a Method of Moments
approach to estimate the two parameters µ and λ, i.e., I match moments generated by the
model given some values of the parameters to the respective moments generated by the data.
I compute standard errors by bootstrapping the procedure 200 times.
Let me discuss the identification of the parameters. I use conditional order effects b(q)
in single-vote elections for all percentiles to estimate the share of behavioral voters in the
electorate. First, strategic voters do not create order effects for candidates with vote shares
in low percentiles in single-vote elections or (almost) none in multi-vote elections, so order
effects for these elections identify the share of behavioral voters. The variation of order
effects for larger percentiles identifies the preference parameter as these order effects must
come from strategic voter, which only occur if vote shares are sufficiently close for behavioral
voters to change the election outcome - and the vote share distribution is determined by
preferences. For example, if behavioral voters would never change the election outcome, i.e.,
the vote share distribution would imply that vote shares are far apart from each other, we
would not get any strategic order effects and thus no curvature of total order effects.
I estimate the preference parameter µ to be µˆ = 0.503, CI90=[−1.13, 0.7] . In three-
candidate elections, this value implies with the logit specification the following preferences:
on average, 76% of voters prefer the candidate with the highest mean utility over the one
with the second-highest mean utility (and similarly the 2nd over the 3rd); and 90% prefer
the candidate with the highest mean utility over the one with the lowest mean utility.
Results, three-candidate elections: I estimate the share of behavioral voters to be
λˆ = 1.73%∗∗∗, CI95 = [0.05, 2.42],
which is comparable to my previous estimate of behavioral voters in three-candidate elections
and to the share of behavioral voters in two-candidate elections as shown below. Given this
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share of behavioral voters, I estimate that rational order effects b− λ account for around
bˆ− λˆ = 52.7%∗∗∗, CI95 = [38.5, 109]
of all order effects. Note that this uses the estimated share of total order effects in the
model.27
2.4.3 Counterfactual analysis - winning advantage
So far, we have talked about vote share percentages, i.e., how many more votes candidates
get when listed first. An alternative measure of election performance is whether a candidate
wins the election (Meredith and Salant [2013]). For example, in elections with 2 candidates,
candidates are expected to win on average 50% of all elections. Order effects may then be
measured by the difference in the number of elections won by the first-listed candidate and
by other candidates.
In single-vote elections with 3 candidates, the first-listed candidate wins 7.09%∗∗ more
elections than other ballot positions. This is a 14% increase in the probability to win, which
should be around 33% without order effects.28 In my model, behavioral voters are ignorant
of the election's outcome, whereas strategic voters only vote for top-two candidates in single-
vote elections. This suggests that strategic voters' votes have a higher chance of deciding
elections and rational order effects may thus have a larger impact on who wins.
To test this, I use the estimate of the distribution of preferences µˆ of the structural
estimation above and compare how various counterfactual models match the data. For this,
I focus on how well the models replicate the advantages of the first-listed candidate in terms
27Four-candidate elections: These results are, due to the lower number of elections (572 elections vs 1,638
in three-candidate elections), not as statistically powerful. I estimate the share of behavioral voters to be
λˆ = 0.8%, CI = [−0.68, 1.6],
and rational order effects account for
bˆ− λˆ = 52.94%∗∗∗ CI = [5.88, 55.72].
28To be clear: 7.09· 2
3
≈ 4.7 is the increase over the expected winning chances of around 33.3%.
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of elections won and vote shares.
Further, I want to evaluate the following policy to reduce order effects: suppose instead
of giving every voter in the election one ballot with the same ballot ordering, we give out
two ballots with two different ballot orderings randomly distributed across all voters. This
introduces some ballot order randomization but is less costly than providing all possible
ballot orderings, particularly if electronic voting is not available.29 We would expect that
such a policy has little impact on order effects in model with only behavioral voters, but
may significantly affect a model with both behavioral and rational voters.
Let me present the results from the counterfactual simulations in table 2.1 that assess the
impact on winning chances of either type of order effects. Specifications (1) through (3) use
the parameter values previously estimated. I find that when only behavioral voters produce
ballot order effects, the first-listed candidate wins 0.38% more elections than candidates
in other ballot positions (1) or 0.66% more elections when replacing strategic voters with
sincere voters (2).30 In contrast, the first-listed candidate's winning advantage increases to
to 3.91%, around 6 times as large than without rational order effects (3).
Next, specifications (4) through (6) present what share of behavioral voters is needed
to replicate the winning proportions in the data; these results are scaled up versions of
specifications (1) to (3).31 A purely behavioral version of my model requires a large share
of behavioral voters to replicate the data of around 13% to 20%, (4) and (5), while allowing
for strategic voters substantially reduces the need for behavioral voters to just 3.2%, (6).32
29Costs here could refer to both administrative costs of election officials or costs that voters might occur,
such as a lack of a sample ballot, etc.
30The logit specification can readily be extended to comparisons of multiple candidates as is necessary for
sincere voters:
P (uij = argmaxk≤muik) =
exp(Uj/µ)∑
k≤m exp(Uk/µ)
.
I assume that preferences are independent of voter type, so sincere voters and strategic voters share a
common preference parameter µ.
31Albeit taking into account possible nonlinear effects introduced by the vote share distribution.
32Note that these results are estimated using the parametrization implied by the strategic voting model
discussed above. However, that model simplifies strategic voting to both allow for sharp analytical results
but also to allow identification without additional restrictions on the data. Therefore, the results presented
here may thus be seen as suggestive of the importance of strategic voting and behavioral voting. A more
extensive estimation could be conducted similar to Kawai and Watanabe [2013].
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Lastly, I evaluate the previously mentioned policy of using two ballots with two different
ballot orderings in table 2.2. Here, I set the share of behavioral voters to 3.2% behavioral
voters, which is the share of behavioral voters needed in my model to create the observed
winning proportions in the data.33 In the two-ballot policy case, the values listed in the
table are the sum of the respective advantages for each candidate. There is no difference
between these two candidates in my simulation.
Specifications (1) and (2) evaluate the effects of the policy in a purely behavioral model
with sincere voters and behavioral voters. I find that the policy has indeed no effect on order
effects.34 In contrast, when considering the model with both behavioral and rational order
effects in specifications (3) and (4), I find that the winning advantage of 7.06% without
the policy reduces to −0.2% when the policy is implemented. In terms of vote shares, the
advantage reduces from 9.07% without the policy to 1.86% with the policy.35 Thus, the
policy has substantial effects on the winning advantage of the first candidate when rational
order effects also exist. Not shown in the table, but the results are similar for four-candidate
elections.
2.4.4 Estimation of behavioral share - two-candidate elections
Next, note that in two-candidate elections, there is no room for strategic considerations as
strategic voters always vote for their preferred candidate. This implies that any ballot order
effects must be due to behavioral voters, so we can directly estimate the share of behavioral
voters in these elections. I therefore estimate unconditional ballot order effects restricted to
two-candidate elections; the results are shown in table 2.3. I find that ballot order effects are
33Using the same parameter values, a purely behavioral model would need at least 13%.
34The small differences are due to finite data - the first candidate may just have had a higher mean utility
on average.
35Interestingly, the size of the advantages with the policy are smaller in the model with rational order
effects than in the model without. In a nutshell, rational order effects in my model exist because the
behavioral advantage eliminates equilibria in which the first candidate would be pushed up in the rankings,
which are no longer feasible equilibria, and the equilibrium selection function I presume in my model says
that every equilibrium has equal probability. However, with two candidates gaining such an advantage, the
only other candidate that can be overtaken is the candidate not listed first in any election. But since that
only happens when that other candidate has a relatively low vote share (as the first candidates need to be
able to overtake her in terms of vote shares), we eliminate only equilibria where the non-first candidate has
a low vote share. This ultimately reduces her disadvantage.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model Pure Pure Behavioral Pure Pure Behavioral
% behavioral behavioral + strategic behavioral behavioral strategic
Parameter values:
Share of behavioral voters 1.37 1.37 1.37 20.0 13.1 3.2
Share of strategic voters 98.63 0 98.63 80 0 96.8
Share of sincere voters 0 98.63 0 0 86.9 0
Estimated moments:
Winning advantage 0.38 0.66 3.91 7.02 7.0 7.06
(Observed: 7.08)
Vote share advantage 1.37 1.37 4.83 20.0 13.1 9.07
(Observed: 3.35)
Table 2.1: Simulation of counterfactuals, three-candidate elections. Logit parameter set to
0.490. 6,000,000 simulated elections.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model Pure Pure Behavioral Behavioral
% behavioral behavioral + strategic +strategic
Winning advantage (sum): 1.54 1.56 7.06 -0.2
Vote share advantage (sum): 3.2 3.24 9.07 1.86
Two-ballot policy No Yes No Yes
Table 2.2: Counterfactual evaluation of two-ballot policy, three-candidate elections. Logit
parameter set to 0.490. 6,000,000 simulated elections. Share of behavioral voters set to
3.2%, purely behavioral models includes no strategic voters.
around 1.99%, which must be completely due to behavioral voters.36 This estimate of 1.99%
is comparable to the share of behavioral voters in three-candidate elections as estimated
using the method above, which corroborates the sensibility of our results.37 Moreover, the
finding of ballot order effects in two-candidate elections suggests that any theory of ballot
order effects necessarily requires behavioral voters, as strategic voters cannot generate ballot
order effects in two-candidate elections.
36This estimate provides a lower bound on the number of behavioral voters of any kind if we were to allow
for different theories of behavioral voting.
37Note that the results above use the distribution of vote shares in two-candidate elections, thus the
estimate of behavioral voters in two-candidate elections is identified separately.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES % Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share Vote Share
First 2.301*** 2.066*** 2.063*** 1.990*** 1.990***
(0.637) (0.566) (0.570) (0.566) (0.566)
Incumbent 12.30*** 12.49*** 16.27*** 16.27***
(0.498) (0.509) (0.649) (0.649)
Full term 0.00784 -0.00545
(0.0516) (0.0531)
Open seat 8.217*** 8.212***
(0.327) (0.328)
Time & Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Office dummies Yes
Observations 3,976 3,976 3,976 3,976 3,976
R-squared 0.007 0.176 0.178 0.230 0.230
Clustered (by election) standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3: Ballot order effect in two-candidate elections.
2.4.5 Discussion of results
My results show that, in my model, strategic voters amplify the initially behavioral vote share
advantage up to roughly twice the size in single-vote elections. Moreover, simulations suggest
that behavioral voters alone can generate only a portion of the increased winning chances of
the first candidate observed in the data. This points to the potential empirical importance
of strategic voting when considering order effects and shows how strategic complementarity
in elections can naturally lead to a rational amplification of behavioral tendencies.
These findings also supplies indirect evidence of strategic voting. In fact, the take on
strategic voting here is different from the literature as I investigate the interaction between
strategic (rational) voting and behavioral voting.
As evidenced by the frequent requirement of ballot order randomization (Miller [2010]),
ballot order effects are typically perceived as detrimental to society because they introduce
a systematic advantage for a particular candidate based on characteristics determined by
the election design rather than the candidate itself; in addition, this endogeneity may also
allow external manipulation of elections. While my study presents further evidence on the
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existence of ballot order effects, at the same time it also provides a new perspective on the
normative desirability of a ballot ordering common to all voters. Namely, a common ballot
ordering may serve as a coordination device and can thus improve the election outcome
for parts or even all of the electorate. For example, a majority that is split between two
alternatives can coordinate on the first-listed candidate to overcome the coordination barrier
and thus beat out a less-preferred alternative. In this case, the overall welfare may have
increased when evaluated with, for example, a utilitarian welfare function. In fact, there
are cases in which ballot order effects even allow for a Pareto improvement.38 Therefore,
ballot order effects may indeed be beneficial to society - a view that is, to the best of my
knowledge, new to the literature.
Nevertheless, if one wishes to eliminate ballot order effects, my study provides new and
cheaper ways to do so. I show that a randomization scheme that only requires two differ-
ent ballot orderings instead of all permutations already significantly reduces order effects
if strategic voters are partially responsible for ballot order effects. For example, numerical
simulations suggest that just by using two different ballot orderings, order effects in elec-
tions with few candidates may be substantially reduced (by around 79%) or even removed
as rational order effects decrease due to the spreading of behavioral advantages across can-
didates.39
Adding to the literature, my results also suggest that some election systems are more
prone to ballot order effects: plurality elections may provide more incentives to vote strate-
gically and therefore increase ballot order effects relative to runoff elections. I find empirical
evidence supporting this by using data from the same source on of runoff elections: candi-
38To see this, consider an election with candidates A, B, and C where voters give out a single vote and one
winner is elected. Suppose the majority of size α > 0.5 prefers A  B  C and the minority of size 1 − α
prefers C  A  B. Without ballot order effects, the only two equilibria possible are either A or B winning
(in the model introduced above). Now suppose that a λ share of voters always votes for the first-listed
candidate but still enjoys the same preferences as other voters (i.e., they fail to recognize their preferences
or are unaware of it, etc.). If λ > 1−α, an election in which A is listed first leads to the unique equilibrium
of candidate A winning. Thus, since every voter indeed prefers A over B, removing the equilibrium in which
candidate B wins from the set of feasible equilibria is a Pareto-improvement (given that the equilibrium B
has indeed positive probability).
39Note that these values are for a particular choice of parameters in the model. A different set of parameters
would change the quantitative results, but the qualitative intuition would still hold.
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dates listed first benefit significantly less in runoff elections compared to plurality elections,
reducing ballot order effects by roughly 45%.40 Moreover, my model provides a rationale
for observing significant ballot order effects even in salient elections where one would expect
behavioral ballot order effects to be fairly small as what matters for strategic voters is their
perception of the first candidate's advantage.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies ballot order effects in elections both theoretically and empirically. I
use data from Californian local elections where ballot positions are assigned according to
candidates' names and a randomly drawn alphabet before the election. To explain the new
empirical regularities of ballot order effects established in chapter 1, I offer a novel theory
combining both rational and behavioral aspects of voting that can explain these empirical
regularities Here, behavioral voters vote for the first candidate on the list, while rational
voters vote for candidates that are both liked by them and likely to win the election. But
rational voters may respond to the advantage of candidates listed first on the ballot and as
such amplify the initially purely behavioral ballot order effects, giving rise to the possibility
of rational ballot order effects.
I then show how to separate rational order effects and behavioral ones in the data (as
both favor the first-listed candidate) using the empirical regularities mentioned above. I
consider a specification that allows for any proportion of behavioral voters and let the data
(Californian local elections) select the best estimate of this proportion. As such, I find
that rational voters double the vote share advantage of the first candidate compared to
behavioral voting alone. Moreover, counterfactual simulations suggest that rational order
effects have substantially larger effect on the winning chances of the first-listed candidate
than behavioral voters in my model due to the focus of strategic voters on candidates that
have chances to win.
40This is not to say that the estimated effect cannot be due to other differences between plurality and
runoff elections.
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Order effects are commonly attributed to behavioral or non-standard behavior. In con-
trast, my study provides evidence that some part of observed order effects could generally be
rational if there exists some strategic interaction between individuals. This finding can be
extended to other settings. For example, Jacobs and Hillert [2014] finds order effects in finan-
cial markets by observing that stocks with initial letters early in the alphabet enjoy higher
trading activity. Since investment decisions are likely to exhibit strategic complementarity,
individuals could benefit from accounting for these (behavioral) order effects.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Definitions and assumptions
Here, I provide a formal analysis of the mechanism described in the body of the chapter.
I use a superscript to refer to a candidate's ballot position, i.e., candidate ck is the
candidate in ballot position k; a subscript denotes expected vote share rank, i.e., candidate
ck has the k-th highest expected vote share τ .
I make the following assumptions in the chapter:
Candidates enter independently:
Assumption A: U j ⊥ Uk for all j 6= k.
Voters' valuations for candidates are independent of each other:
Assumption B: εij ⊥ εik for all j 6= k and all i.
Distribution of individual error shocks is independent of candidate identity:
Assumption C: F (ε; c) = F (ε) for all c.
Bounded utility:
Assumption D: uik is bounded for all i and k.
Two technical assumptions:
Assumption E: The distributions of error shocks F (ε) and mean utilities G(u)
are continuous and non-degenerate.
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Assumption F: For all candidates j, k in an election it holds that P (uij >
uik) ∈ (0, 1).
No indifferences in preferences:
Assumption G: uik 6= uik′ for any k 6= k′ and all i
Competing candidates:
Given some vote share ranking r, without ties in the vote share ranking, the definition
of competing candidate opp(ck) is as follows:
opp(ck) = cj s.t.

r(cj) = w, if r(ck) > w,
r(cj) = w + 1, if r(ck) ≤ w.
To extend the definition to allow for ties, first consider single-vote elections:
Suppose there is a n-way tie for the first vote share rank and denote the set of the
candidates that tie for first place by C1, where n ≤ m. Then, any candidate tying for first
place is a competing candidate of every other candidate, i.e., for all candidates c ∈ C it holds
that any c′ ∈ C1 \ c is a competing candidate of candidate c.
Next, suppose there is a unique highest-ranked candidate and there is a n-way tie for
the second vote share rank, where n ≤ m− 1 and denote the set of these candidates by C2.
Then, the competing candidate of any candidate not ranked first is the highest ranked c1,
i.e., for all c ∈ C \ c1, opp(c) = c1. The competing candidate of the highest ranked candidate
c1 is every candidate in the set C2.
If the top-two ranked candidates are unique and there is a tie in vote share ranks beyond
the second rank in single-vote elections, simply use the definition for when there are no vote
share rank ties.
Next consider multi-vote elections:
Suppose there is a n-way tie between the candidates ranked last and denote this set by
Cw+1, where n ≤ m. Then, any candidate tying for the last place is a competing candidate
of every other candidate, i.e., for all candidates c ∈ C it holds that any c′ ∈ Cw+1 \ c is a
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competing candidate of candidate c.
Suppose there is a unique last-ranked candidate, but a n-way tie for second-to-last place.
The last-ranked candidate cw+1 is then the competing candidate of every other candidate,
and any candidate ranked second-to-last is the competing candidate of the last-ranked can-
didate.
Lastly, if the last-ranked candidates and the second-to-last ranked candidates are unique,
then we can use the definition from above without worrying about vote share ties.
2.6.2 Formal analysis of rational order effects
In voting equilibrium, strategic voting behavior can be described using a voting algorithm
due to the conditions on pivot probabilities. I will now describe this algorithm. Take any
specific strategic voter i. Recall that w denotes the number of winners in an election and the
number of votes a voter may give out. Consider some τ and its implied vote share ranking
r.
First suppose there are no ties in vote shares. The algorithm is then as follows for
single-vote elections:
(Strategic) Voting algorithm [single vote]:
1 Vote for candidate c1 if uic1 > uic2 . Vote for candidate c2 if uic1 < uic2 .
2 Stop.
Consider the example of τA > τB > τC with only one winner. Step 1 of the algorithm then
implies that voters vote for candidate A if uiA > uiB and for B otherwise. Voters will never
vote for candidate C (which implies that τC = 0 if C is not listed first).
Next, in elections with w votes per voter and winners, I say that a candidate that
is expected to rank w or better is winning. Note that candidate cw is the lowest-ranked
expected winning candidate and candidate cw+1 is the highest-ranked expected losing can-
didate. Moreover, these two candidates are also the competing candidates of each other.
The voting mechanism for multi-vote elections (m = w+ 1) is as follows if there are no ties:
63
(Strategic) Voting algorithm [multiple votes]:
1 Vote for candidate cw if uiw > uiw+1. Vote for candidate cw+1 if uiw < uiw+1.
2 Vote for candidate cw−1 if uiw−1 > uiw+1.
3 If w = 2, stop. If w > 2, vote for candidate cw−2 if uiw−2 > uiw+1.
4 If w = 3, stop. If w > 3, vote for candidate cw−3 if uiw−3 > uiw+1.
5 ....
Consider the example of τA > τB > τC with two winners and two votes. Step 2 implies that
voters vote for candidate cB if uiB > uiC and for C otherwise. Then, continuing to step 3,
the voter votes for candidate cA if uiA > uiC . Then stop.
Next, consider the algorithm when there are vote share ties. For single-vote elections,
let C˜ denote the set of candidates that tie for first and/or second place.
(Strategic) Voting algorithm [single vote]:
1 Vote for candidate c that maximizes utility among all candidates that tie for first or
second place, c = argmaxc∈C˜u(c).
2 Stop.
Next, in multi-vote elections, let Cr be the set of all candidates that tie for vote share rank r
and nr the number of candidates in Cr. For convenience, if there are ties, select any feasible
ranking and name candidates according to this vote share ranking.
(Strategic) Voting algorithm [multiple votes]:
1 Vote for candidate cw+1 if nw · uiw+1 >
∑nw
j=1 u(c(j)) for all c(j) ∈ Cw.
2 Vote for candidate cw if nw+1 · uiw >
∑nw+1
j=1 u(c(j)) for all c(j) ∈ Cw+1.
3 Vote for candidate cw−1 if nw+1 · uiw−1 >
∑nw+1
j=1 u(c(j)) for all c(j) ∈ Cw+1.
4 If w = 2, stop. If w > 3, vote for candidate cw−2 if nw+1 · uiw−2 >
∑nw+1
j=1 u(c(j)) for all
c(j) ∈ Cw+1.
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5 ....
Lemma When a set of pivot probabilities satisfies the M-pivot probability con-
dition and the Uncertainty condition with respect to some expected vote shares
τ , votes derived from the voting algorithm are optimal for every strategic voter
given these pivot probabilities.
Proof. First consider single-vote elections. Consider the case when there are no ties in
the vote share ranking. Consider some set of pivot probabilities that satisfies the M-pivot
probability condition for arbitrarily largeM > 0 and that satisfies the uncertainty condition.
Consider some voter i. The expected utility of voting for candidate ck can be written as
u˜i(ck|p) =
∑
cj∈C
pi(ck, cj) [uik − uij ].
Expanding this yields:
u˜i(ck|p) = p(ck, c1) · [uik − ui1] + p(ck, c2) · [uik − ui2] + ...
Recall that the M-pivot probability condition implies that for M > 0 it holds
p(ck, copp(ck)) ≥M · p(ck, c)
for any c ∈ C \ {ck, opp(ck)}, where opp(ck) is candidate ck's competing candidate. In
single-vote elections, candidate c1's competing candidate is candidate c2, whereas candidate
c1 is the competing candidate of every other candidate. Thus, the M -pivot probability
condition implies that, as it holds for arbitrarily large M > 0, the pivot probability of
candidates c1 and candidate c2 is one magnitude larger than any other pivot probability.
Thus, p(ck, ck′)/p(c1, c2) converges to zero if {k, k′} 6= {1, 2}.
With this, it holds that the expected utility of voting for any candidate other than the
top-two candidates must converge to zero when divided by p(c1, c2), which is strictly positive
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by the uncertainty condition, as the utility difference between any two candidates is finite
for any voter i in the election:
u˜i(ck|p)/p(c1, c2) = p(ck, c1)
p(c1, c2)
[uik − ui1] + p(ck, c2)
p(c1, c2)
[uik − ui2] + ...
so that with M →∞
u˜i(ck|p)/p(c1, c2)→ 0
for any k > 2.
Next, for candidates 1 (and similarly for 2) it holds that
u˜i(c1|p)/p(c1, c2) = ui1 − ui2 + p(c1, c3)
p(c1, c2)
[ui1 − ui3] + ...
so that with M →∞ it follows that
u˜i(c1|p)/p(c1, c2)→ ui1 − ui2.
So if ui1 − ui2 > 0 voter i votes for 1, for candidate 2 otherwise, as in the algorithm.
Utilities cannot be equal due to assumption G.
Next, consider multi-vote elections. The logic of the proof is analogous to the one for
single-vote elections. In multi-vote elections, voters choose votes ai to maximize
u˜i(ai|p) =
∑
aij=1
u˜i(ck|p).
Note that the expected utility of voting for the least-preferred candidate will always be
negative as any candidate is preferred to that candidate. Then, as in these multi-vote
elections voters have w votes to give to w + 1 candidates and they will never vote for their
least-preferred candidate, voters maximize u˜i(ai|p) by simply voting for all candidates with
positive u˜i(ck|p). Expanding the expected utility of any voter's expected utility of voting
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for candidate k yields
u˜i(ck|p) = p(ck, c1)[uik − ui1] + p(ck, c2)[uik − ui2] + ... ≥ 0
With the pivot probability condition and by a similar reasoning above, we find that when
we divide by p(ck, copp(ck)), which is strictly positive by the uncertainty condition,
u˜i(ck|p) ≥ 0
⇔ uik − uiopp(ck) ≥ 0
This implies the result with the definition of competing candidates.
The proof for when there are ties is analogous. As by the M -pivot probability condition
it holds that p(c, opp(c)) = p(c, opp(c)′) for all competing candidates opp(c) and opp(c)′,
dividing the expected utility of voting for a candidate by the pivot probability of p(c, opp(c))
leaves only the terms ui(c) and ui(opp(c)) of all competing candidates. Then, for single-vote
elections, optimal voting requires voting for the candidate with the largest utility among c
and the competing candidates opp(c).
In multi-vote elections, it holds that u˜i(ck|p) is positive if and only if nw+1 · uik >∑nw+1
j=1 u(c(j)) for all c(j) ∈ Cw+1 for candidates ranked higher than the last rank or nw ·uik >∑nw
j=1 u(c(j)) for all c(j) ∈ Cw for the last-ranked candidate. This follows, again, by dividing
the expected utility by p(c, opp(c)).
Corollary In voting games with either w = 1 or m = w + 1, a strategic voter's
votes in equilibrium are determined by comparisons of uic and uiopp(c) and the
vote share ranking implied by τ .
Consequently, given preferences, a vote share ranking implies a unique vote share
configuration.
Moreover, due to assumption E, the ex-ante probability of observing a tie in
expected vote shares that are non-zero in equilibrium is zero.
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Propositon Every voting game with either w = 1 or m = w + 1 has at least
one equilibrium.
Proof. I prove this for the different types of elections separately.
1. Let us start with single-vote elections, i.e., m > w = 1. I will now show that there
always exists an equilibrium in which the first-listed candidate is ranked among the top
two which then directly implies the result. I am going to construct such an equilibrium as
follows:
Choose the first-listed candidate c1 and some other candidate ck. Consider the following
voting profile: any strategic voter who prefers c1 over ck votes for c1, and for ck otherwise.
Further let behavioral voters vote for the first candidate c1. I now show that this voting
profile is an equilibrium.
This voting profile leads to the following vote shares τ :
τ(c) =

0 if c ∈ C \ {c1, ck}
P (ui1 > uik) if c = c
1
P (ui1 < uik) if c = c
k
.
Consider pivot probabilities defined by
p(c, c′) =

1 if (c, c′) ∈ {(c1, ck), (ck, c1)}
0 otherwise
It is easy to check that these pivot probabilities are consistent with the M-pivot probability
condition for any M > 0 and the uncertainty condition regarding the vote share ranking
implied by τ .
Now, we can derive optimal votes with the formal algorithm above using the vote shares
τ(c), which coincide with the voting profile specified above as c1 and ck are the top-two
candidates - i.e., the voting profile is optimal given these pivot probabilities. Moreover,
behavioral votes are optimal as they vote for the first-listed candidate. Thus, this is an
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equilibrium.
2. For two-candidate elections, consider the voting profile given that every voter votes for
his or her preferred candidate. This is clearly optimal for any pivot probability p(c1, c2) > 0,
which also satisfies the uncertainty condition and the M-pivot probability condition for any
vote share ranking possible and the one given by τ1 and τ2 in particular. Thus, this is an
equilibrium.
3. Next, consider multi-vote elections where m = w + 1 with w > 1. To construct an
equilibrium, pick the candidate with the lowest mean utility ck that is not listed first and
the first-listed candidate c1. Consider first the case in which the following holds:
P (uic1 > uik) · (1− λ) + λ < P (uic > uic1) · (1− λ) +
w − 1
m− 1 · λ.
The other cases follow by a similar logic. The meaning of this restriction will become clearer
later on, but, simply stated, it says that the first-listed candidate has a lower vote share
than her competing candidate in equilibrium.
Consider the voting profile such that strategic voter i votes for candidate cj if ui(cj) >
ui(c
1) for j > 1 and i votes for candidate c1 if ui(c1) > ui(ck); behavioral voters vote for
candidate c1 and any candidate ck such that aik = 1 if uik 6= argmink 6=c1uik. I show that this
indeed constitutes an equilibrium. Note that the behavior of behavioral voters is optimal
by definition of behavioral voting.
Let T be the share of all votes given out over all votes that could have been given out,
multiplied with w, which then comes out to
T = (
∑
cj 6=c1
P (uicj > uic1) + P (uic1 > uick)) · (1− λ) + λ · w.
The voting profile gives rise to the following vote shares:
τ(c) =

(P (uic > uic1) · (1− λ) + w−1m−1 · λ) · wT if c ∈ C \ {c1, ck}
(P (uic1 > uick) · (1− λ) + λ) · wT if c = c1
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Pick some arbitrarily large M > 0 and consider the set of pivot probabilities such that
p(c1, ck) = 1 and p(c1, ck′) = 1/M for candidate ck′ with the third-lowest vote share τk′ ,
p(c1, ck′) = 1/M
2 for the candidate τk′′ with the fourth-largest vote share τk′′ (if it exists),
and so on.
These pivot probabilities are consistent with theM -pivot probability and the uncertainty
condition as is easy to check. Note that assumptions B and C of iid utility valuations for
candidates imply that the vote share ranking for candidates not listed first using the vote
shares stated above is equivalent to the mean utility ranking:
τ(ck) > τ(ck′)
⇔ P (uick > uic1) > P (uick′ > uic1)
⇔ P (Uck + εick > Uc1 + εic1) > P (Uck′ + εick′ > Uc1 + εic1)
⇔ P (Uck + ε > Uc1 + ε) > P (Uck′ + ε > Uc1 + ε)
⇔ Uck > Uck′ .
This means that the candidate with the lowest mean utility ck is ranked lower than any
other candidate not listed first; this then implies that the first-listed candidate is ranked
last due to the assumption above. The voting algorithm given in lemma 2.6.2 then implies
that the voting profile is optimal due to the assignment of competing candidates based on
the vote share ranking: candidate c1 is the competing candidate of every other candidate,
while candidate ck is the competing candidate of c1. Thus, we have an equilibrium.
The other case is reasoned analogously: now, the first-listed candidate is not ranked last,
so the candidate with the lowest mean utility among all candidates that are not listed first is
ranked last - and thus the competing candidate of every other candidate. Then, since every
candidate not listed first has a higher mean utility, it follows again with assumptions B
and C that this is an equilibrium if we sort any non-first candidate by mean utility. Where
exactly the first-listed candidate is ranked depends on her vote share, but will not affect the
identity of the last-ranked candidate.
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2.6.2.1 Multi-vote elections
Note that a voting game is defined by:
• Candidates' mean utilities U1, ..., Um
• Idiosyncratic error shock distribution F with standard error σF
• Share of behavioral voters λ
• Number of votes per voter and winners w
• Ballot ordering y
Denote by φk(σF ) the share of strategic voters preferring candidate ck over the competing
candidate opp(ck)
φk(σF ) = P (uik > uiopp(ck)),
which depends on the distribution F and thus on σF . For some equilibrium and its associated
vote share ranking, let again T (σF ) be the sum of all votes given out divided by the number
of voters multiplied by the number of votes per voter (which corresponds to all possible
votes that could have been given out)
T (σF ) =
∑
j<m−1
P (uij > uim|σF ) · (1− λ) + 1− λ+ λ · w.
Further, let τλk (σF ) given σF denote the vote share due to behavioral voters
τλk (σF ) =

1/T · w k = c1
w−1
m−1/T · w, k 6= c1
.
Lemma In multi-vote elections, when preferences become homogeneous σF → 0
and the share of behavioral voters λ is less than m−12·(m−1)−(w−1) , strategic vote
shares are independent of ballot ordering in equilibrium almost surely. (I.e., no
rational order effects)
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Proof. First note that φk(σF )→

0 U(ck) < U(opp(ck))
1 U(ck) > U(opp(ck))
, i.e., strategic voters will either
all vote for a candidate or no strategic voter will. This follows from that all votes come
from being preferred to the competing candidate (due to the voting algorithm). And when
preferences become homogeneous, voters will be arbitrarily close to the mean utility, which
then implies that candidates will get no votes if their mean utility is less than that of the
competing candidate,
P (uik > uiopp(ck)) = P (U(ck) + εik > U(opp(ck)) + εiopp(ck))
→σF→0 1{U(ck) > U(opp(ck))}
Now, consider any equilibrium. Candidate's ck vote share τk is (with the voting algo-
rithm):
τk(σF ) · T (σF )/w = φk(σF )(1− λ) + λτλk (σF ).
I now want to show that the candidate with the lowest mean utility must be ranked last in
equilibrium, regardless of ballot ordering. Note that one candidate has to have the unique
lowest mean utility almost surely because of the continuous mean utility distribution.
First suppose that the candidate with the lowest mean utility is not listed first. In that
case, her total vote share will only be behavioral (which is w−1m−1λ/T · w) because strategic
voters will not vote for her as mentioned above. But every other candidate gets at least
the same behavioral voter share as well because behavioral voters randomly vote for any
candidate not listed first (who will get even more). This means that any candidate who gets
at least some strategic votes will be ranked higher than her.
Now consider two cases: First, suppose that she were ranked second-to-last. In that
case, she would be the competing candidate of the last-ranked candidate, but since her
mean utility is lower than that of any other candidate, the last-ranked candidate would get
strategic votes. But this would push the last-ranked candidate's vote share above the vote
share of the candidate with the lowest mean utility, thus leading to a contradiction.
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Second, suppose she were ranked higher than second-to-last. But this implies that the
second-to-last and the last-ranked candidate would need to get no strategic votes as they
would otherwise have a higher vote share. But this is not feasible as one of the two must
get some strategic votes as they are competing candidates of each other. Thus, she must be
ranked last if she is not listed first.
Next, suppose the candidate with the lowest mean utility is listed first. In that case, her
vote share is λ - she does not get any strategic votes, but this time at least all behavioral
votes. Now suppose for contradiction that she is not ranked last. This implies that the
candidate with the second-lowest mean utility is ranked last (by a similar logic to above).
This then also means that every strategic voter votes for every winning candidate (other
than the first-listed one) as these candidates all have a higher mean utility than the last-
ranked candidate. Moreover, these winning candidates get a w−1m−1λ behavioral vote share as
they are not listed first. Comparing the vote share of these winning candidates with that of
the first-listed candidate we find
τ(c1) < τ(cwinner)
⇔ λ < (1− λ) + w − 1
m− 1λ
⇔ λ(2− w − 1
m− 1) < 1
⇔ λ < m− 1
2 · (m− 1)− (w − 1)
Thus, with the condition on λ, the first-listed candidate has a lower vote share than any
winning candidate, so she must be ranked second-to-last. But in that case, she is the last-
ranked candidate's competing candidate. And since her mean utility is lower than that of
every other candidate, the lowest-ranked candidate would indeed get a higher vote share
than her (by the same reasoning as above).
Taken together, regardless of ballot position, the candidate with the lowest mean utility
must be ranked last. And because all strategic voters vote identically, all winning candidates
get equal strategic votes, so a change in the vote share ranking among winning candidates
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due to behavioral voters will not change strategic vote shares. Moreover, the identity of the
last-ranked candidate is independent of ballot order; and because the last-ranked candidate
never gets strategic votes, we find that strategic votes are independent of ballot ordering.
2.6.2.2 Single-vote elections
Lemma In single-vote elections, let there be no behavioral voters λ = 0. Then,
for any pair of candidates, there exists an equilibrium for which these two can-
didates are among the τ -top two candidates. (Equilibria give rise to exactly
m(m−1)
2 vote share configurations almost surely.)
Proof. This proof is analogous to the proof of claim 2.6.2. Note that given the identity of
the top-two candidates, the ensuing vote share configuration is unique. With probability
one there are no identical mean utilities, so with m(m−1)2 possible candidate pairs, there will
be m(m−1)2 vote share configurations.
Lemma In single-vote elections (with a possibly positive share of behavioral
voters), equilibria give rise to at most m(m−1)2 vote share configurations almost
surely.
Proof. Behavioral voters do not take the play of others into account, so their behavior is
identical in every equilibrium. This means that they have the same impact on all vote share
configurations, which leaves the number of different vote share configurations the same. And
since the maximal number of candidate pairs that rank first or second is still m(m−1)2 , the
number of vote share configurations among the equilibria cannot be larger than this due to
corollary 2.6.2.
Let the strategic voting profile be the part of the voting profile due to strategic voters.
Lemma In single-vote elections, the strategic voting profile of an equilibrium
with no behavioral voters λ = 0 is not feasible in any equilibrium of the same
game but with behavioral voters λ > 0 iff i) the vote share of the second-ranked
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candidate is weakly lower than λ1−λ and ii) some candidate ranked below second
is listed first.
Proof. If: Consider an equilibrium with no behavioral voters λ = 0 in which the vote share
of the second-ranked candidate implied by the optimal votes is lower than λ1−λ (but strictly
positive due to assumption F) and the first-listed candidate is not ranked first or second.
Then consider the same voting game with some λ > 0 behavioral voters. The vote share
of the candidate ranked second will then be less than λ · 0 + (1 − λ) · λ1−λ = λ, which
implies that the candidate listed first will overtake the candidate ranked second. But with
this new vote share ranking, there would be no strategic voters voting for the previously
second-ranked candidate (which is a positive number due to assumption F), thus, the voting
profile is no longer optimal. Moreover, no other combination of top-two candidates can give
rise to the same strategic voting profile as candidates only get positive strategic vote shares
if they are among the top two candidates (and assumption F implied that both top-two
candidates indeed received a positive number of votes in the λ = 0 equilibrium). In case
the second-ranked candidate's vote share is exactly λ1−λ (which happens with probability 0),
assumption F implies that the voting profile changes. The result follows.
Iff: If these conditions are not satisfied, then behavioral voters will not affect the vote
share ranking or which candidates are among the top two. And since the vote share ranking
completely determines voting behavior given the formal algorithm above (corollary 2.6.2),
the voting behavior of strategic voters is unaffected.
Lemma In single-vote elections for σF → 0, the relative number of vote share
configurations in which the first candidate gets a vote share of λ is lower than
the relative number of vote share configurations in which a non-first candidate
gets a zero vote share.
Proof. Note that with σF → 0, strategic vote shares are either zero or one.
Without ballot order effects, the number of equilibria won by any position is the same
and the number of equilibria in which the first candidate gets a strategic vote share of 1 is
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also the same as for non-first candidates. Now, the previous lemma 2.6.2.2 states that some
top-two candidate pairs are feasible in equilibrium when there are only strategic voters but
no longer when we introduce behavioral voters. But a pair of candidates is no longer feasible
only if the first-listed canidate is not among them, in which case she would have gotten only
behavioral votes λ. Meanwhile, it removes m− 2 zero vote shares of non-first candidates of
m−1 non-first candidates in total, thus only a m−2m−1 fraction of zero vote shares for non-first
listed candidates. Thus, the result follows.
Assumption 1: Vote share configurations are drawn independently and with
equal probability from a given voting game.
Proposition In single-vote elections, with assumption 1 and if σF → 0, there
exist 0 < qa < qb < 1 s.t.
i) b(λ, σF ; q)− λ→ 0 with q ∈ [0, qa],
ii) b(λ, σF ; q)− λ > 0 with q ∈ [qa, qb],
iii) b(λ, σF ; q)− λ→ 0 with q > qb.
Proof. The proof is illustrated in figures 2.3 and 2.4. Again, note that strategic vote shares
with σF → 0 are either zero or one.
Point i) follows from that there exist equilibria in which the first candidate has lower
mean utility than the competing candidate due to randomly determined ballot order and
the non-degenerate distribution of mean utilities. The first candidate gets no votes other
than the behavioral ones in these equilibria. This implies qa > 0.
Point ii) follows from lemma 2.6.2.2 and assumption 1. Without order effects, the relative
vote shares at each percentile level for first candidates and non-first candidates are the same.
But since there will be fewer vote share configurations in which the first candidate gets a zero
vote share than non-first candidates due to lemma 2.6.2.2, the relative number of vote share
configurations in which the first candidate gets a positive vote increases given assumption
1. As percentiles sort vote share configurations by vote shares, it follows that there will
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be percentiles for which the first candidate receives a positive vote share while non-first
candidates do not, so qa < qb.
Point iii) follows from the random assignment of ballot order and that there are non-
first candidates who win in equilibrium. Thus, these candidates will have a higher mean
utility than their competing candidatein some equilibria and thus the same vote share as
first candidates with high vote share percentiles, so qb < 1.
The main theorem simply follows from propositions 2.6.2.1 and 2.6.2.2.
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Figure 2.3: Proof proposition 9 illustration, no behavioral voters
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Figure 2.4: Proof proposition 9 illustration, with behavioral voters
Chapter 3
Newspapers, Voting, and Languages
3.1 Introduction
Voting is a fundamental part of the political process. Newspapers have long been credited
for advancing a healthy political environment and for driving voters to the polls. This lead
to various recent studies on the the link between media and political engagement of cit-
izens (Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel [2009], Strömberg [2004]) and, more specifically, on
how newspapers affect political turnout (Gentzkow et al. [2011], Cage [2014]). However,
an investigation of this relationship has been notoriously complicated due an inherent en-
dogeneity problem: newspapers increase voters' interest in politics, but at the same time
politically active citizens may have different preferences regarding newspapers because of
their heightened interest in politics.
To address this inherent lack of identification, I make use of language variation across
Europe. Specifically, languages differ in how efficiently they express information. Such
language efficiency may affect the production costs of printed news, which make up a sub-
stantial fraction of newspaper companies' revenue. I write a tractable model of newspapers
to derive the implications of language efficiency on newspaper sales and quality. Consistent
with these theoretical predictions, I find that individuals in countries with more efficient lan-
guages read newspapers significantly more frequently - a finding robust to considering only
immigrants, controlling for peer effects in newspaper reading behavior, and using country-
level data. I then argue that language efficiency itself is exogenous to political engagement
and thus can be used as an instrument to estimate the effect of newspaper consumption on
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voting behavior. Here, I find that newspaper consumption seems to have a positive effect on
immigrants' likelihood to vote and on their interest in political issues, even while controlling
for the potential inherent endogeneity. These findings confirm the intuition that newspaper
consumption fosters political engagement.
I start by deriving a measure of (written) language efficiency. Compare for example the
English proverb All is fair in love and war with its German equivalent In der Liebe und
im Krieg ist alles erlaubt. These two versions are literal translations of each other, but the
German phrase is considerably longer. To estimate language efficiency more extensively, I
use various parallel corpora. These corpora are large compilations of texts translated into
two or more languages and frequently used in linguistic studies. My primary corpus is
the so-called JRC-Acquis corpus that consists of legislative texts of the European Union
translated into all official EU languages (Tiedemann [2012], Steinberger et al. [2006]). For
a given language pair, e.g., English and German, the sentences in the two languages are
aligned, which allows me to randomly sample sentences from both languages and compare
their relative number of lines. Doing this repeatedly, I estimate the relative efficiency, or
physical length, of a language (relative to English). I show that this measure seems robust
to the context and original language of the source text, but less so to its level of writing.
For example, a corpus consisting of movie subtitles will provide a starkly different measure
than one compiling EU laws.
I restrict the analysis to European languages that use the Latin alphabet to facilitate
comparison. I find that Spanish, German, and Dutch are least efficient, which are all roughly
12% longer than English, but for varying reasons. Compared with English, Spanish uses
significantly more words of the same length, while German uses significantly fewer words,
which are particularly long. On the other end of the spectrum, Estonian and Latvian are
most efficient, both around 10% shorter than English. Their efficiency gain is due to a
remarkable low number of words compared to English.
With such a measure of language efficiency at hand, I then investigate its relationship
with newspapers. A daily newspaper written in English that consists of 25 pages of text
81
would be 28 pages long in German, thus adding three pages to be printed every day. These
differences may significantly affect newspapers as costs of printing account for a large portion
of a newspaper's revenue: for instance, The New York Times states in its 2013 Annual Report
that production costs other than wages and benefits amount up to 19% of total revenue;
moreover, price shocks for newsprint, the paper used for newspapers, alone are considered
a significant risk factor1.
I first write a simple theoretical model of a newspaper market. Here, I distinguish
between two channels of how language efficiency may affect a newspaper's sales and quality:
first, more efficient languages may lower the production costs of newspapers; second, more
efficient languages may change the valuation of newspapers by consumers directly. I show
that these two channels can be separated based on their joint predictions on average reading
time and likelihood of reading newspapers.
I then turn to an empirical evaluation of these predictions. I analyze an European-wide
survey, the European Social Survey, ESS [2010], where individuals are asked about various
topics including their newspaper reading habits. I find that respondents in countries with
more efficient languages2 spend significantly more time reading newspapers, controlling for
a fairly large variety of individual-level characteristics. This estimated effect comes mainly
from an increase in the likelihood to read newspapers rather than a longer reading time per
se, which is consistent with a supply-side driven mechanism where efficient languages reduce
production costs.
Next, I test the robustness of these effects. First, it is possible that underlying differ-
ences in culture may be causing our results, i.e., Italians may just read more newspapers
than Germans. Note that I assign language efficiency based on the country of residence,
not based upon the individual's language itself (however, I restrict the sample to individuals
who speak the domestic language at home).3 Therefore, if language efficiency were in fact
1New York Times Annual Report 2013, URL: http://investors.nytco.com/investors/financials/annual-
reports/, accessed: 3/2/2016
2For that, I need to assign a unique value of language efficiency to countries, which is straightforward
for countries where the majority of the population speaks only one language. I discuss how I treat countries
where multiple languages are spoken in the body of the chapter.
3In another regression, I restrict it to individuals who say that they speak the domestic language at home
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causing changes in newspaper reading behavior rather than underlying differences in cul-
ture, we would still observe similar results when restricting our sample to immigrants, i.e.,
immigrants to Italy versus immigrants to Germany.4 But indeed, a regression restricted to
immigrants provides similar results to the general one. Here, individual-level controls in the
regression address some potential sorting issues. Additionally, including a dummy for an im-
migrant's birth country leaves the qualitative results intact, further suggesting that cultural
effects play at most a minor role in this estimation. Similarly, including mean newspaper
readership in the region to control for potential peer effects does not affect the qualitative
results either. Lastly, I also provide evidence for an aggregate effect of language efficiency
on newspaper sales, using a cross-country regression for country-level newspaper sales and
various macroeconomic controls.
Next, I turn to an investigation of the connection between newspaper sales and political
variables such as voter turnout and interest in politics. To address the possible lack of
identification, I use the connection of language efficiency and newspaper reading behavior
as established above. However, my results suggest that language efficiency may be a weak
instrument when considering all individuals in the data, I thus focus my analysis on the
subsample of immigrants.
As mentioned above, I provide evidence that language efficiency affects newspapers
through a reduction in production costs. This suggests that language efficiency is exogenous
to political engagement of voters as political advertisement through TV or radio does not
rely as extensively on the written word as newspapers do. Moreover, [Pellegrino et al., 2011]
finds that verbal language, not written language as in the present study, exhibit a simi-
lar information rate across languages, i.e., Spanish and English transmit a similar amount
of information per second. And since advertisements in TV and radio often use verbal
communication, these forms of advertisement are less likely to influenced by language char-
acteristics.
Then, I find that in a simple regression, without making use of language efficiency as an
most often.
4I require immigrants to be at least 21 or 18 years old when migrating to the new country.
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instrument, the relationship between newspaper reading behavior and the likelihood of vot-
ing is insignificant and of small magnitude. When using an instrumental-variable approach,
I find that the point estimate increases substantially and becomes significantly positive.
This suggests that, for immigrants, newspapers indeed have a positive relationship on the
likelihood of voting even when controlling for the inherent simultaneity. The direction of the
change indicates a downward bias, which points towards a negative correlation between read-
ing behavior and voting. One explanation may be that politically active individuals consult
other forms of media such as the internet or TV rather than newspapers to stay informed.
I find a similar result when looking at political interest rather than voting behavior.
My findings provide evidence that newspaper reading behavior indeed increases political
engagement for the subsample of immigrants. Why exactly voters turn out is still a puzzle
(voting paradox), but this study suggests that political interest or awareness of current
political affairs drives voters to the polls, which sheds some light on a fundamental process
of democracy.
Moreover, my results suggest that languages have a significant impact on the newspaper
industry and potentially on other industries, such as the pulp and paper industry. The study
of the economic relevance of language is an understudied phenomenon, an important excep-
tion is a recent study [Chen, 2013] which shows that individuals who speak a language that
clearly separates present and future save less as they perceive future events psychologically
farther away.5
3.2 Language efficiency
In this section, I illustrate the notion of language efficiency and describe how I estimate it.
5My study also provides a perspective on newspaper markets with bilingual populations, which is, to some
extent, the case with Spanish and English in the US. In these markets, newspapers that use the less efficient
language (Spanish in the US) suffer from an inherent disadvantage that may inhibit their competitiveness.
However, many of these imbalances are removed in an online environment, as additional internet space is
virtually costless. My findings therefore predict that newspapers written in less efficient languages benefit
more from the recent and still imminent digitization, leading to more even competition across newspapers.
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3.2.1 Language efficiency
Languages differ in their (written) efficiency, i.e., how much space they require to express
information. Language efficiency can depend on various features of a language such as its
vocabulary or grammar. For example, in German it is common to simply connect two words
to form a new one which may reduce its efficiency: Germans say Abendessen when referring
to dinner, which translates literally to evening meal.
To illustrate how grammar may affect language efficiency, note that English has a more
rigid sentence structure than other languages, which may limit, for example, how word order
can be used for emphasis: the sentence I will go there tomorrow emphasizes the timing
of the trip more than Tomorrow I will go there. However, it is impossible to do the same
with go or I due to the rigid sentence structure. While italics can be used to emphasize
any part of the sentence, it is also common to add an extra phrase such as in Tomorrow I
will go there, not today, thus lengthening the sentence.
Another important determinant of language efficiency is its underlying alphabet. Lan-
guages that use the Latin alphabet like English may need more space than ones using the
Chinese alphabet, which has significantly more characters and can thus express information
more concisely.6
However, as language is used to communicate in a variety of ways, there is not just one
measure of language efficiency that applies equally well to all contexts. For example, I show
that language efficiency is substantially different when estimated using either movie subtitles
or legislative texts. I discuss this issue more below.
Language efficiency is related to a linguistic concept called language complexity. While
there are various definitions of language complexity in the literature, it is generally per-
ceived that more [structural units/rules/representations] means more complexity (Hawkins
[2009]). It is commonly assumed that all languages are equally complex, just that complexity
manifests itself in different aspects of a language. For instance, in English it is grammatical
6But, the increased complexity of a single letter in the Chinese alphabet may also call for a larger font
size. I avoid this difficulty by restricting my analysis to languages that use the Latin alphabet.
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to say Money can't buy everything, while in German one would need to say Mit Geld kann
man nicht alles kaufen, which translates literally to With money can one not everything
buy.7 The English phrase is simple in that the noun phrase (Money) is directly followed
by the verb phrase (can't buy), but it requires a more complex structure regarding the
sentence's agent (Money), as money is not actually doing the buying.
It can be helpful to consider language complexity when one is concerned with language
efficiency. For example, Juola [2008] suggests that translations are usually more explicit
due to a loss of implied information found in the original language. As an example, be-
tween two Englishmen it is understood that Manchester is located to the North of London,
while knowledge of this cannot be assumed when talking to Americans, which necessitates
additional explanations. This change in complexity may then also affect language efficiency.
However, despite their similarities, language efficiency and language complexity are not
interchangeable concepts, which merits separate consideration of language efficiency. To
see this, note, for example, that a language that capitalizes every word is as complex as a
language that capitalizes none, but both are less complex than one with a non-degenerate
set of rules. In contrast, language efficiency decreases the more letters are capitalized, as
capitalized letters take more space.
3.2.2 Estimation
I now estimate language efficiency. To do this, I use so-called parallel corpora, large com-
pilations of texts translated into two languages. Each phrase in these corpora is aligned
with its equivalent in the other language. As mentioned above, I ultimately use this mea-
sure in relations to newspapers, so it is important to use parallel corpora that consist of
texts stylistically close to newspaper articles. However, parallel corpora are still rare for
languages other than major ones like English or Spanish, so it is not possible to use a corpus
of newspaper articles for each language. Instead, my main corpus is the JRC-Acquis parallel
corpus that compiles the total body of European Union (EU) law applicable in the the
7This word order is common in Germany and easily understood.
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EU Member States and provides translations for almost all languages spoken in the EU
(Tiedemann [2012], Steinberger et al. [2006]). Below I discuss the robustness of my estima-
tion method of language efficiency with respect to the particular choice of a corpus. For the
remaining languages that are missing in the JRC-Acquis corpus, I use other, comparable
parallel corpora.8
These corpora use English as a reference language and align the English sentences with
sentences in a second language. Below in figure 3.1, I provide some sample sentences that
are extracted from four versions of the JRC corpus.
Figure 3.1: Sample sentences from 4 different versions of the JRC Acquis corpora
I use Microsoft Excel and Word in the estimation procedure. First, I remove or replace
all line-breaking characters (hyphens9, paragraphs,etc.) in the corpora. I then format the
text to font size two to minimize the effect of line-breaking due to long words, as these
conventions may differ internationally and Word might not capture them accurately. I use
Times New Roman for the baseline results due to its popularity, but consider other fonts
for robustness checks.
I further remove phrases with fewer than 8 words in either language or that have more
than 5 words with two consecutive capital letters. This is done to eliminate idiosyncrasies
of the corpora I use which occasionally contain phrases that consist solely of numbers or
symbols. I then randomly select n = 200 sentences in each language, append them, and
compare their count of lines. I repeat this ns = 500 times and the average of the calculated
8Namely the DGT, a corpus made from translation memories of the European Commission's Directorate-
General for Translation Steinberger et al. [2012], a corpus consisting of phrases from the EU bookshop (EU
BookShop Skadin² et al. [2014]), and SEtimes, a corpus of news articles of the Southeast European Times
Tiedemann [2009], Agi¢ and Ljube²i¢ [2014].
9I replace hyphens with [, which is close in physical length in the Times New Roman font, but does not
break lines.
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ratios constitutes then my efficiency measure.
3.2.2.1 Results
Table 3.1 presents the estimated efficiencies. The table includes language efficiency measured
by the count of lines and several corpus characteristics such as the number of characters,
number of words, both relative to the English part of the corpus, number of words that are
capitalized in English, fraction of words capitalized in the second language in the corpus,
and language family.
There is a strong correlation (p = .96) between efficiency measured by lines and by
characters. Since the first can be thought of as a weighted count of characters, where the
weights are given by the Times New Roman font, it directly suggests that the choice of font
has little impact on relative sizes. I confirm this for the case of Spanish below.
There is significant dispersion of the relative count of words (σ = 0.121), which also has
a weaker correlation with the count of lines (p = .723). Notably, German has a very low
word count (88.8%), but a very high line count (111.7%), which suggests that it tends to
have long, expressive words that are equivalent to whole phrases in English. In contrast,
Spanish is one of the least efficient languages in terms of lines (111.9%), but has a large
word count (112.5%), the highest of all languages.
With respect to capitalization of words, most languages seem to capitalize slightly fewer
words than English, which capitalizes approximately every 6th or 7th word (including the
first word of a sentence or text). A stark outlier to the top is German, which capitalizes more
than every third word (37.2%), which may contribute to its inefficient writing. Remember
that in German all nouns are capitalized, compared to only proper nouns in English.10
Among language families, Romance languages are least efficient (106.3%), followed by
Germanic languages (103.9%), Slavic (98.2%), Uralic (97.3%), and finally Baltic languages
(91.6%). Out of all Romance languages, only Romanian (98.4%) is more more efficient
than English, whereas all other Romance languages are substantially less efficient. This
10Omitting other rules of capitalization, as this seems to be the most important difference.
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difference seems to come from their high word counts (102.6%). In contrast, Uralic and
Baltic languages stand out due to their low word counts of 70.9% and 76.11% respectively,
which suggest that these languages have particularly expressive, but concise words.
Language Length Characters Words CapitalsEn CapitalsOT Language Family
Croatian∗ 101.5% 101.3% 93.5% 23.3% 19.6% Slavic
Czech 91.1% 88.6% 82.4% 15% 10.1% Slavic
Danish 98.5% 98.4% 88.7% 15% 10.5% Germanic
Dutch 111.6% 109.6% 101.7% 15.6% 11.1% Germanic
English 100% · · · · Germanic
Estonian 89.5% 88.9% 66.8% 15.2% 10.9% Uralic
Finnish 99.4% 99% 67% 15.9% 11.6% Uralic
French 107.8% 109.1% 105% 14.4% 8.4% Romance
German 111.7% 107.3% 88.8% 14.8% 37.2% Germanic
Hungarian 103% 101.6% 79% 14.5% 10% Uralic
Icelandic∗∗∗ 101.7% 101% 96.8% 15.3% 12.1% Germanic
Irish∗∗∗ 105.8% 106.3% 106.4% 19.4% 18.2% Celtic
Italian 104.8% 107.6% 99% 14.9% 9.2% Romance
Latvian 90.8% 90.2% 77% 15.8% 13.8% Baltic
Lithuanian 92.4% 92.4% 75.3% 15.9% 13.5% Baltic
Norwegian∗∗∗ 101.5% 102.1% 94.9% 15.8% 14.4% Germanic
Polish 107% 101.2% 84.6% 15.9% 13.4% Slavic
Portuguese 108.3% 105.9% 104.1% 15.8% 12.6% Romance
Romanian 98.4% 101.2% 92.7% 14.4% 9.1% Romance
Slovak∗∗ 98.8% 95.6% 87.1% 18.5% 14.5% Slavic
Slovenian∗∗ 92.5% 91.4% 86.5% 18.6% 15.9% Slavic
Spanish 111.9% 111.9% 112.5% 15.6% 10.9% Romance
Swedish 97.8% 97.7% 87.7% 15% 8.7% Germanic
Table 3.1: Estimates of language efficiency. Corpora: JRC, *SETimes, **DGT,***EU
Bookshop
The next table 3.2 provides robustness results using Spanish and English parallel corpora,
as there are particularly many parallel corpora available for this language pair. First note
that the estimate of the efficiency measure is sensitive to the level of writing of the underlying
corpus. When using a corpus of movie subtitles (Subtitles [Tiedemann, 2012]11), the new
estimate of the language efficiency of Spanish relative to English is 98.4%, which is a −13.5%
change to the EU law corpus. However, movie subtitles are often not accurate transcriptions
or translations of what is being said in the movie but rather written to fit the screen, which
may account for the estimated efficiency being close to 1. When using a corpus made of
11http://www.opensubtitles.org/
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EU parliament speeches (Europarl Koehn [2005]), the relative efficiency decreases in favor of
Spanish as well, with a −3.9% change. This may be due to that the Europarl corpus consists
of speeches, which may be more colloquial in nature than written texts, thus complicating a
translation between languages. Lastly, if we consider corpora with a similar level of writing
to that of the JRC-Acquis, for example one of translated documents from the UN (UN Eisele
and Chen [2010]) or one of phrases from the EU bookshop (EU BookShop Skadin² et al.
[2014]), the estimates are fairly robust with only marginal changes of 0.6% and −0.3%, resp.
However, even when considering the latter two corpora, UN and EU BookShop, the
relative number of words varies by more than the efficiency measure (up to a change of
3.8%) as does the ratio of capital letters (up to 2.5% difference). This likely reflects the
different nature or context of these corpora, which supports the robustness of the efficiency
measure.
A potential issue in estimating language efficiency is the direction of translation as de-
scribed above. To address this, I use the Europarl corpus as it records the original language
of the speaker for some speeches. Restricting the analysis to excerpts where the original
language is either English or Spanish, the sign of the change (−0.6% change) in efficiency
is in line with findings from language complexity as Spanish becomes relatively more effi-
cient when it is the document's original language. However, while the estimate of language
efficiency changes with the original language of the document, it is not clear how this result
carries over to the JRC corpus which consists of legislative documents rather than speeches,
as speeches may be more dependent on the original language. Additionally, Koehn [2005]
suggests that it is easier to translate between closely related languages, which may also affect
the estimated efficiency of the different languages in my sample.
With regards to other parameters, such as the number of repetitions ns, the number of
minimum words in a phrase or the font, the estimates are robust, with at most changing
by 0.2%. Taken together, we find that the results are robust to the procedure, direction of
translation, and the chosen font, but less so to the kind of texts included in the corpus.
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Language Scenario Length Change Characters Words CapitalsEn CapitalsOT
Spanish JRC Corpus (baseline) 111.9% . 111.9% 112.5% 15.6% 10.9%
Spanish Europarl Corpus 108% -3.9% 107.1% 103.7% 12.8% 10.4%
Spanish Subtitles Corpus 98.4% -13.5% 97.4% 92.3% 15.8% 14.1%
Spanish UN Corpus 112.5% 0.6% 112.5% 115.9% 18.2% 13.9%
Spanish EU BookShop Corpus 111.6% -0.3% 111% 108.6% 17.1% 15%
Spanish Min. words=2 111.8% -0.1% 111.8% 112.5% 16.1% 11.4%
Spanish ns=1500 111.8% -0.1% 111.8% 112.5% 15.6% 10.9%
Spanish font: Georgia 111.7% -0.2% 111.8% 112.5% 15.7% 10.9%
Spanish Europarl, Originally Spanish 107.4% -0.6% 106.6% 104.1% 13% 10.4%
Spanish Europarl, Originally English 109.1% 1.1% 108.2% 104.9% 13.1% 10.7%
Table 3.2: Robustness of language efficiency, Spanish
3.3 Theory
In this section, I illustrate how language efficiency as defined above may affect daily print
newspapers. I first show that language efficiency may reduce production costs and can
therefore affect newspaper supply. Next, I study how language efficiency can influence
consumers' demand for newspapers if it reduces the time necessary to read newspapers.
3.3.1 Supply side
First consider the supply side of the newspaper market. Physical production of a newspaper
entails substantial costs for a newspaper company. For example, The New York Times states
in its 2013 Annual Report that production costs other than wages and benefits amount up to
19% of its total revenue 12. Similarly, shocks to the prices of the paper used for production,
called newsprint, are considered a significant risk for the company. It is common to assign
reporters articles with a limit on words or space and an important part of a newspaper
editor's job is to fit all news. Newspapers also sometimes trade off legibility and production
costs by increasing the amount of news on a page. The front page of the New York Times
in 1914 is a particularly striking example of this as shown in figure 3.2.13
The analysis of language efficiency in the previous section shows that languages differ
12New York Times Annual Report 2013, URL: http://investors.nytco.com/investors/financials/annual-
reports/, accessed: 3/2/2016
13The New York Times Company, ProQuest. (2014) Front page of
The New York Times on July 29, 1914, Retrieved 12/25/2014, from:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:New_York_Times_Frontpage_1914-07-29.png.
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Figure 3.2: New York Times 1914 front page
in how much space they require to express information. These differences may then sub-
stantially reduce a newspaper's costs to print and distribute newspapers. For example, an
English-speaking daily newspaper requires 3 pages less than a German newspapers of 28
pages of text every day.
3.3.1.1 Supply model
Let a newspaper in a given country operate under monopolistic competition. Newspapers
face demand
D(P, q) = B + q − P
at price P ≥ 0 and quality q > 0 and some demand parameter B ≥ 0, which may depend on
the newspaper's quality. Let language efficiency be denoted by L, with higher L meaning
more efficient languages, i.e., the inverse of required space. Quality q is a composition of
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space occupied by images i, advertisement a, and text t printed
q = q(i, t, a).
I assume that all inputs into quality are positive and that quality is increasing in the amount
of text in the newspaper qt > 0. Moreover, I assume that a newspaper can only choose either
high quality qh or low quality ql, qh > qL. This simplifies exposition, while still capturing
the essence of the model.
Cost of quality is determined by a cost parameter cq > 0 and I assume that total
costs increase quadratically with sales cqD(P, q)2. The cost parameter cq is an increasing
composition of the costs for images, text, and advertisement. I assume that high quality is
associated with a higher cost per unit, ch > cl. While I do not specify the direct relationship
between the cost of text and the cost of quality, I assume that high quality ch is more
strongly increasing in the cost of text than low quality cl. This may either come from the
higher relative ratio of text or the higher quality of text in high-quality newspapers. Thus,
since language efficiency decreases costs of text, the cost ch of high-quality newspapers is
more strongly decreasing in language efficiency L than that of low-quality newspapers cl.
Assumption: The cost parameter ch decreases more strongly than cl with
language efficiency L.
The newspaper maximizes profits pi by choosing price P and quality q
pi(P, q) = D(P, q) · (P + a)− cqD(P, q)2.
Taking derivatives we find that
FOCP : P
∗ =
(B + q) · (1 + 2 · cq)− a
2 · (1 + cq) , (3.1)
so that
D(P ∗, q) =
a+B + q
2 · (1 + cq) .
93
This means that a newspaper prefers high quality qh over low quality ql if
(a+B + qh)
2
(1 + ch)
>
(a+B + ql)
2
(1 + cl)
. (3.2)
Consider now aggregate newspaper markets. Newspaper in a country may differ in their
cost of quality. Denote by εh(L) the share of newspapers in a country that choose high
quality given language efficiency L, i.e., those newspapers for which the previous inequality
3.2 holds in the specified direction.
Our first result now states that more efficient languages imply a lower optimal price
P ∗(q). When languages become more efficient, the cost of text decreases, which is then
optimally met with a lower price. This follows from the derivative of the optimal price with
respect to cost of quality in equation 3.1.
Proposition For any quality q, P ∗(q) is increasing in cq and therefore decreasing
in language efficiency L.
However, along with this direct effect of a lower price, language efficiency may also affect
the composition of newspapers with respect to quality. If a language becomes more efficient,
text becomes cheaper. As high-quality newspapers are producing relatively more text, they
benefit more of such a cost reduction and so high quality may become more profitable. This
follows from the comparison of profits for firms as shown in equation 3.2 and the assumption
that ch is more strongly increasing in L.
Proposition The share of high-quality newspapers εh(L) is weakly increasing
in language efficiency L.
Total sales D in a country are the sum of high-quality and low-quality newspapers
D =
∫
D(P ∗, qh) +D(P ∗, ql)dF (cq).
This effect of language efficiency on sales may be either positive or negative, depending on
how well low-quality newspapers compared to high-quality newspapers:
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First suppose the distribution of costs c for newspapers in the market is such that for all
newspapers equation 3.2 is a strict inequality with one side being clearly larger, meaning that
high-quality newspapers are much more profitable choosing high quality and vice versa. Now,
this means that language efficiency affects the quality decision of only a few newspapers.
Thus, the share of high-quality newspapers εh(L) is relatively constant with respect to L.
Therefore, the direct effect of a lower optimal price P ∗(q) at every level of quality and the
resulting higher sales outweigh any potential indirect sales effect stemming from differences
in the quality composition. Taken together, overall sales increase.
In contrast, suppose there are many newspapers with costs at the margin of equation 3.2,
i.e., profits operating under high quality are only slightly smaller than under low quality and
vice versa. A more efficient language may have then push many low-quality newspapers
over to high quality. And if optimal sales of low-quality newspapers are higher than those of
high-quality newspapers, sales in the economy may altogether decrease in language efficiency.
Remark
Total newspaper sales D in the economy may increase or decrease in language
efficiency L, depending on the distribution of cq across newspapers.
But this also means that a more efficient language only lowers sales if the share of high-
quality newspapers increases sufficiently. In that case, the loss in overall sales of low-quality
newspapers outweighs the gain of higher sales at every quality level. At the same time, this
also means that the relative share of high-quality newspapers (weighted by sales) increases,
which then implies a higher average quality Q¯ of newspapers in the market
Q¯ =
∫
q∗D(P ∗, q)dF (cq)/D.
Corollary
If total newspaper sales D in the economy are decreasing in language efficiency
L, average quality of newspapers Q¯ must be increasing in language efficiency L.
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The last result states that the ratio of text to pictures increases with the efficiency of a
language because text becomes relatively cheaper. The relative ratio of text to advertise-
ment, however, depends on the specific form of advertisement in question, i.e., whether
advertisement consists of mainly text or pictures.
Proposition The relative amount of pictures to both advertisement ia and text
i
t is increasing in language efficiency L.
The ratio of advertisement to text at is increasing in language efficiency L if
advertisement costs are less responsive to language efficiency than costs for text.
3.3.2 Demand side
Next, consider the demand side of the newspaper market. As a more efficient language takes
less space to write, it may be easier or faster to read, which could then affect a consumer's
valuation of newspapers. I implement this possibility in a formal model below.
Note that reading is a bilateral process. The amount of information transmitted during
reading is therefore influenced both by a language's complexity as well as a reader's under-
standing of the text. Thus, an individual's reading speed may simply adjust to a language,
e.g., readers of an inefficient language just skip redundant parts. Accordingly, [Pellegrino
et al., 2011] finds that different languages verbally transmit information at a similar rate
despite differences in the information content of the written text. Therefore, if reading out
aloud and reading quietly (to oneself) are related, more efficient languages are not necessarily
easier or faster to read.
3.3.2.1 Demand model
Let consumer k's perceived quality q˜k of a newspaper be a function of its objective quality q
q˜k = q + εk
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i.e., people are more likely to think highly of a higher-quality newspaper than of a lower-
quality one, where εk denotes some mean-zero shock.
Newspaper reading time Tk is a function of perceived quality q˜k, language efficiency L,
and some personal component pk such as reading speed, etc., which leads to
Tk = T (q˜k, L, pk),
where reading time increases with perceived quality q˜k, (weakly) decreases with language
efficiency L as discussed above, and decreases with pk.14
Consumer k's utility for a newspaper depends on the consumer's perception of the news-
paper's quality q˜, the newspaper's price P and the time Tk spent to read the newspaper
uk(j) = u(q˜k, P, Tk),
where utility increases with perceived quality ∂u/∂q˜k > 0 , but decreases with both price
and required reading time, ∂u/∂P < 0 and ∂u/∂Tk ≤ 0 (fixing the other variables).15'16
This implies that while utility for a newspaper uk does not directly depend on language
efficiency, it is indirectly affected by language efficiency through reading time Tk. Thus,
newspapers in more efficient languages should sell more due to higher utilities of consumers
for newspapers.
Next, consider the average time spent on reading newspapers T¯ (q, L)
T¯ (q, L) =
∑
k
T (q˜k, L, pk).
Here, a more efficient language directly reduces the reading time of individual k. Addi-
tionally, there are two potential composition effects that affect average reading time, but
14There is no need for putting actual quality into the definition of reading time.
15Here, I assume that required reading time negatively affects the consumer's valuation of a newspaper.
If the opposite were true, i.e., a higher reading time for a given information content, the consumer could
simply reread the articles.
16I do not allow for idiosyncratic price coefficients - if there is no significant systematic correlation between
price sensitivity and other parameters in the model, it is not necessary to model this.
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do so in opposite directions: first, individuals with a particularly high reading time would
only read newspapers when the language is relatively efficiency. But this influx of slow
readers would then increase average reading time. Second, individuals who find newspapers
more interesting may be those who spend more time reading, so people who do not read
newspapers spend only little time reading newspapers. Therefore, adding these uninterested
readers would reduce average reading time. To help with interpretation, I assume that the
second case is relevant, i.e., that the impact of personal components pk on reading time Tk
is sufficiently weak.
Proposition If the impact of personal components pk on reading time Tk is
sufficiently weak, a more efficient language implies higher sales D and less time
T¯ spent on reading newspapers on average.
3.3.3 Combined predictions
As evident from the previous discussions, the predictions of language efficiency on newspaper
statistics depend on which mechanism is relatively more important, the cost-reduction or
demand-side mechanism.
To summarize the three predictions of the model, let βxL be the effect of language effi-
ciency L on statistic x ∈ {D,T}:
Supply-side corollary 3.3.1.1:
• 1) Efficient languages increase sales βDL > 0 without definite predictions for reading
timeβTL ≷ 0; or
• 2) Efficient languages decrease sales βDL < 0, but those who buy newspapers actually
read more βTL > 0;
Demand-side proposition 3.3.2.1:
• 3) Efficient languages increase sales βDL > 0, but decrease time spent reading newspa-
pers βTL < 0.
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Estimating the effects of language efficiency on sales D and reading time T allows us to
distinguish between these predictions and evaluate which mechanism of language efficiency
dominates.
3.4 Empirical analysis - Language efficiency and newspapers
I use the previously constructed measure of language efficiency in cross-country regres-
sions in Europe to estimate its impact on the newspaper industry. I first estimate the
effect of language efficiency on individual-level newspaper reading behavior as measured in
a European-wide survey. I run two regressions, one with the whole population and one with
only immigrants, as detailed below. In both settings, I find that the propensity to read
newspaper significantly increases with the language efficiency of the individual's country of
residence, supporting the importance of language efficiency for the newspaper market.
Next, I estimate the aggregate effect of language efficiency on newspaper sales. Similar
to the individual-level evidence, I find that language efficiency is significantly positively
correlated with aggregate sales when controlling for a few macroeconomic trends related to
the newspaper industry.
3.4.1 Identification discussion
To obtain consistent estimates, the regression needs to satisfy the typical assumptions of
exogenous regressors, etc. Here I discuss potential failures of these assumptions in our
context.
To measure a causal effect of language efficiency on newspaper statistics, I need to assume
that language efficiency itself is not affected by the newspaper industry in a country. It is
possible that newspapers have used their influence on the public to shape the domestic
language and have made it more efficient, intentionally or as a natural process of writing
efficiently. Consequently, higher news readership may have brought about a more profound
change in a country's language, resulting in a more efficient written language.
This line of reasoning would then also suggest that older newspaper industries would
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have had more time to influence languages. However, it seems that the oldest newspapers
in Europe were established in the areas of modern Germany and Central Europe, where
languages are among the least efficient ones in Europe, Weber [2006].17 While not conclusive,
it suggests that this particular reverse causality may not be an important force in the data.
Assumption 1: Newspapers did not have a differential effect on language effi-
ciencies across countries.
Next, it is possible that cultural aspects related to newspapers are also correlated with
language efficiency, e.g., Italians are more inclined to read newspapers than Germans; iden-
tifying the effect of language efficiency on newspaper statistics would then be invalid in a
cross-country regression. This leads to the next assumption:
Assumption 2: Conditional on the set of controls, cultural aspects are uncor-
related with language efficiency.
Nevertheless, in the individual-level data one can relax this assumption. Note that the
language of the newspaper determines the relevant language efficiency, not the language
identity of the individual itself. This means that if we were to observe an individual with
potentially different cultural upbringings but who reads domestic newspapers, we should
still observe the effects of language efficiency. To do so, I test whether restricting the sample
to immigrants who immigrated after they were at least 21 changes the qualitative results.
Assumption 3: Conditional on the set of controls, immigrants that emigrated
after the age of 21 have a cultural background similar to that of their birth
country.
In the individual-level survey, there are a variety of controls available which may address
possible sorting effects of immigrants such as birth country dummies or education controls:
the first one allows us to address sorting issues arising through cultural aspects, while the
latter accounts for differences in education across immigrants. I also construct a variable
17Also, Newspapers: 400 years young!, World Association of Newspapers, 2004, accessed on 3/7/2016 at
https://web.archive.org/web/20100310235015/http://www.wan-press.org:80/article6476.html.
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capturing a region's mean newspaper reading behavior to address network or peer effects
of newspaper reading behavior, e.g., immigrants to Germany might read more newspapers
because their friends and co-workers read newspapers.
3.4.2 Individual-level evidence
I now investigate the effect of language efficiency L on individual newspaper reading be-
havior. To do so, I use the European Social Survey, a cross-national survey in Europe that
spans a variety of topics [ESS, 2010]. Survey interviews are conducted in person, where each
country comprises at least 1,500 respondents, or 800 for countries with fewer than 2 million
inhabitants.18 Interviews were conducted from 2010 until 2012, with most of them held in
2010 or 2011.
Before turning to an empirical evaluation of these predictions, let me further describe
the data. The total data set includes 52,457 observations and removing interviews in coun-
tries to which I cannot assign language efficiency (14,670), removing observations without
information on newspaper reading time (61), dropping interviews from 2012 (145), exclud-
ing individuals from Belgium as these are significantly multilingual (1592), and dropping
individuals from Estonia, Lithuania, and Ireland if they state that one of the languages they
speak at home is not the domestic language due to their large language minorities (139).
This leaves 35,850 individuals. When considering immigrants later on, I will drop Estonia
and Lithuania altogether.
Interviews lasted on average around 69 (σ = 27.1). Respondents are slightly more often
women with 54% and on average 49 years old (σ = 18.7), with the youngest respondents
being 15 years of age, the oldest one 101.19 Respondents have on average 12.4 years of
education (σ = 4.18). The average household size is 2.7 (σ = 1.39) with children living in
36% of them. The main activity in the last 7 days was paid work for 48% of respondents,
education for 10%, unemployment for 8%, and retirement for 28%. A large 92% majority
18I do not use design weights as this chapter is not interested in representativeness of the results.
19There is one 14 years old respondent, but I drop this individual who was mistakenly sampled according
to the survey designers.
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was born in their country of residence, around 13% have at least one parent who was not
born in the country, and 4% consider themselves as part of an ethnic minority. Finally,
respondents rate their happiness to be on average 7.2 (σ = 1.97) points on a 0 to 10 scale
with 10 being best.
The survey includes the question On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do
you spend reading the newspapers?. Its response consists of 8 categories, ranging from No
time at all to More than 3 hours in even half hour intervals. This variable, which I denote
by nwsptotij , where i stands for respondent i in country j, is one of my main dependent
variables in the regressions to follow. Additionally, I construct a variable nwsatallij that
collapses the answers into two categories, one for the lowest response No time at all and
another one for the remaining answers. Around 70% of respondents state that they read
newspapers on an average weekday. If we use the midpoints of the stated intervals (15
minutes) to compute reading time, then, conditional on actually reading newspapers (i.e.,
nwsatallij = 1), respondents read on average for 28 (σ = 16) minutes.
To connect these variables to the previous theoretical model, note that time spent reading
newspapers nwsptotij conditional on reading corresponds to reading time T as specified in
the theoretical model. Similarly, the propensity to read newspapers nwsatallij may be
interpreted for a proxy of newspaper sales D. Let βtimeL = β
T
L denote the effect of language
efficiency L on conditional reading time and βreadL = β
D
L the effect on the propensity to
read at all. With this in mind, the theoretical model then offers three different predictions
regarding language efficiency:
• 1) Efficient languages increase how many people read newspapers βreadL > 0 with no
definite prediction on newspaper reading time βtimeL ≷ 0;
• 2) Efficient languages decrease how many people read newspapers βreadL < 0, but those
who buy newspapers actually read more βtimeL > 0;
• 3) Efficient languages increase how many people read newspapers βreadL > 0, but
decrease time spent reading newspapers βtimeL < 0.
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Note that predictions 1) or 2) come from a supply-side cost reduction due to language
efficiency, while prediction 3) presumes that efficient languages facilitate reading on the
demand side.
Country Frequency Percent Cumumlative
Belgium 1,592 4.22 4.22
Czech Republic 2,379 6.31 10.53
Germany 3,030 8.03 18.56
Denmark 1,575 4.17 22.73
Estonia 1,792 4.75 27.48
Spain 1,885 5 32.48
Finland 1,878 4.98 37.46
France 1,726 4.58 42.03
United Kingdom 2,420 6.41 48.45
Croatia 1,641 4.35 52.8
Hungary 1,561 4.14 56.93
Ireland 2,575 6.83 63.76
Lithuania 1,662 4.41 68.17
Netherlands 1,826 4.84 73.01
Norway 1,548 4.1 77.11
Poland 1,740 4.61 81.72
Portugal 2,144 5.68 87.4
Sweden 1,497 3.97 91.37
Slovenia 1,402 3.72 95.09
Slovakia 1,853 4.91 100
Total 37,726 100
Table 3.3: Number of respondents by country.
I observe a respondent's country of residence from which I can infer the relevant language
length Lj . Moreover, I have information on which languages respondent i speaks most at
home. I create a dummy for whether respondent i is a native speaker (native speakerij) if
the first-mentioned language coincides with the language assigned to the country. Of the
full sample, 94% are considered a native speaker. Most of my analysis restricts the sample
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count mean sd min max
Newspaper reading, time on average weekday, 30 mins 35850 1.30 1.24 0 7
Newspaper reading, at all on average weekday, 30 mins 35850 0.70 0.46 0 1
Language efficiency (inverse of space required) 35850 0.99 0.068 0.89 1.12
Internet 35793 4.39 3.00 0 7
TV 35791 4.35 2.05 0 7
Health 35810 2.29 0.95 1 5
Radio 35752 2.95 2.64 0 7
Interest Politics 35753 2.67 0.91 1 4
Religiousness 35497 4.52 3.01 0 10
Female 35837 0.54 0.50 0 1
Citizen 35835 0.96 0.19 0 1
Minority 35318 0.043 0.20 0 1
Native 35807 0.92 0.27 0 1
Happiness 35635 7.17 1.97 0 10
Native father 35653 0.89 0.31 0 1
Native mother 35768 0.89 0.31 0 1
Children 35825 0.36 0.48 0 1
Immigrant parent 35850 0.13 0.34 0 1
Hhld. size 35818 2.67 1.39 1 14
Years of full-time education completed 35429 12.4 4.18 0 55
Age of respondent, calculated 35742 48.6 18.7 15 101
Start of interview, month 34114 7.84 3.97 1 12
Start of interview, year 34115 2010.5 0.50 2010 2011
Voted last national election (yes=1, no==2, not eligible==3) 35544 1.37 0.61 1 3
Table 3.4: Summary statistics
count mean sd min max
Doing last 7 days: paid work 35850 0.48 0.50 0 1
Doing last 7 days: education 35850 0.10 0.31 0 1
Doing last 7 days: unemployed, actively looking for job 35850 0.054 0.23 0 1
Doing last 7 days: unemployed, not actively looking for job 35850 0.023 0.15 0 1
Doing last 7 days: permanently sick or disabled 35850 0.032 0.18 0 1
Doing last 7 days: retired 35850 0.28 0.45 0 1
Doing last 7 days: community or military service 35850 0.0024 0.049 0 1
Doing last 7 days: housework, looking after children, others 35850 0.14 0.35 0 1
Doing last 7 days: other 35850 0.015 0.12 0 1
Doing last 7 days: don't know 35850 0.00075 0.027 0 1
Doing last 7 days: refusal 35850 0.00017 0.013 0 1
Doing last 7 days: no answer 35850 0.00047 0.022 0 1
Table 3.5: Summary statistics, main activity
to respondents being such native speakers.20
20Results of regressions in which I require individuals to at least mention the country's language as one
of the languages they speak most often at home (spokenij) are similar to the ones presented here.
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The first regression equation is then
{nwsptotij , nwsatallij} = α+ βLLj + γxxij + εij ,
s.t. {native speakerij} = 1
where xij denotes individual characteristics. Individual characteristics include the vari-
ables described in table 3.4 and 3.5, where I use linear education year and age trends and
categorize main activity into employed, unemployed, and rest unless mentioned otherwise.
I use 500 bootstrap repetitions to estimate standard errors, clustering by country.
The first regression in table 3.9 uses as dependent variable the overall or unconditional
time spent on reading newspapers nwsptotij . The estimated coefficient of language length
L in this specification is significantly positive with βL = 1.330∗ (0.772). (1) To provide some
intuition for this number, compare newspapers written in Spanish and English. Spanish is
11.9% longer than English, so the estimate of βL implies that readers of Spanish newspa-
pers spend 2.4 minutes more on reading newspapers every day, compared to an average of
12.2 minutes in Spain in general. In the second regression, with reading newspapers at all
nwsatallij as dependent variable, the coefficient on language efficiency Li is also significantly
positive βreadL = 0.623
∗ (0.297). (2) Here, comparing again Spanish and English newspaper
readers, individuals in Spanish-speaking countries would read newspapers 7.4% less often
due to language efficiency differences, with 52.4% people in total reading newspapers in
Spain. When re-running the first specification with time spent on newspapers nwsptotij as
dependent variable, but now conditional on that individuals read newspapers (i.e., requiring
that nwsatallij is true), the estimated coefficient βtimeL = 0.391 (0.735) is not significant
and substantially lower than when considering all individuals. (3)
These results suggest that efficient languages indeed affect newspaper reading behav-
ior. However, the main effect seems to come from an increase in the propensity to read
newspapers rather than an actual increases in time spent reading newspapers, which is in
line with prediction number 1) as outlined above. This provides support for the supply-side
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mechanism of a cost reduction in newspaper production rather than one that presumes more
efficient languages facilitate reading.
Next, I conduct regressions with similar designs but where I restrict the sample to immi-
grants that migrated after they were at least 21 years old.21 This allows me to account for
possible correlations between language efficiency and culture across countries as discussed
above. In the survey, respondents state whether they are immigrants and, if so, since what
year.22 From this, I compute a variable age at immigrationij taking on 0 if an individual is
a native of the country of residence and the age at which the immigrant came to the country
otherwise.
Of the 8% immigrants in the data, 60% are native speakers as defined above and they
spend on average 29 (σ = 18) minutes reading the newspaper, conditional on reading news-
papers at all, which 66% do.
The second regression equation is then
{nwsptotij , nwsatallij} = α+ βLj + γxxij + εij ,
s.t. {native speakerij} = 1
{ age at immigrationij ≥ 21 yrs} = 1
Table 3.9 shows that the coefficient on language efficiency Lj can still be significant
when restricting the sample to immigrants (specifications 4-8). Regarding unconditional
reading time, the coefficient is βIL = 2.985
∗∗∗ (0.919), implying a 5.3 minute lower reading
time for readers of Spanish newspapers relative to those of English ones. When estimating
the effect of language efficiency on the propensity to read newspapers, we find a coefficient
of βI,readL = 1.152
∗ (0.417), which comes out to a difference of 13.7% between readers of
Spanish and English newspapers. And, again, we find that in a regression with conditional
reading time, the coefficient on language efficiency is not significant βI,timeL = 1.012 (1.563).
21For robustness, I also consider alternative specifications with lower age restrictions as well as regressions
where I require a minimum time spent in the new country.
22They answer the question What year did you first come to live in [country]?
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Next, I construct a variable that captures average newspaper reading behavior across
all individuals (immigrants and natives) in a region. When including this variable in the
last regression, the estimated coefficient on language efficiency is slightly lower, but still
significant with βI,peerL = 2.958
∗∗ (0.936). This suggests that peer effects in newspaper
reading behavior cannot fully explain the findings.
Lastly, I include dummies for the birth country of immigrants to account for potential
sorting effects based on nationality. This accounts for the possibility that Germans migrate
to England and Italians to France, in which case comparing immigrants in England to
immigrants in France would essentially be a comparison between Germans and Italians
(given that they are immigrants). However, including around 130 more dummy variables to
account for birth countries in a regression with 725 observations may reduce the statistical
power of the regression.23 Accordingly, such a regression with birth country dummies does
not produce significant estimates on the effects of language efficiency on reading behavior
(p = .24).
The results for the subsample of immigrants are qualitatively similar to the ones in the
general population, but larger in size, which suggests that cultural differences may cause a
downward bias. Altogether, the analysis of the individual-level data provides evidence for
the importance of languages for newspaper reading behavior and therefore the newspaper
market in general. It further suggests that language efficiency reduce a newspaper's cost
rather than making reading more enjoyable for consumers, which sheds some light on the
specific mechanisms at play.
3.4.3 Aggregate-level evidence
I now provide some additional evidence that languages affect newspaper reading behavior
by exploring the effects of language efficiency on an aggregate level. For this, I collect data
on newspaper sales and several macroeconomic variables at the country level from 1996 to
2004. The data come from various sources, including the UNESCO Institute for Statistics
23Note that birth countries may be different from the set of countries in which interviews were held.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time Propensity Cond. time Time Propensity Cond. time Time Time
Language efficiency 1.330* 0.623** 0.391 2.985*** 1.152*** 1.012 2.985*** 1.329
(0.772) (0.297) (0.735) (0.919) (0.417) (1.563) (0.936) (1.085)
Immigrants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control Region average Birth country
Observations 30,316 30,316 21,411 711 711 485 711 707
R-squared 0.1564 0.0868 0.1056 0.1134 0.0984 0.1095 0.1134 0.2644
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 500 repetitions, clustered by country
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 3.6: Effect of language efficiency on newspaper reading behavior (reading time, reading
propensity, cond. reading time). Controls include variables listed above.
24, UN Statistical Yearbooks, and the Barro-Lee data set (Barro and Lee [2013]). However,
owing to limited data availability, my data set is missing several observations.
I need to assign a unique value of language efficiency to the countries in my sample to test
the relationship between language efficiency and newspapers. While most countries are home
to only one dominant language, assigning language efficiency becomes more complicated
when a country features multiple (official) languages, so I exclude various countries based
on their language demographics. Based on data from the CIA fact book [Agency, 2013], I
exclude
• Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Belgium: They feature multiple official languages and it
is unclear how to assign an appropriate measure of language efficiency on the country
level.
• Ireland : Both Irish and English are official languages, with Irish being the first national
language. While the majority speaks English and newspapers seem to be primarily
written in English, there are Irish newspapers and Irish columns in English-speaking
newspapers 25. In contrast, I do include Finland, where Swedish is an official language,
24UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), Communication and information,
http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/BrowseCommunication.aspx, Data extracted on 03 Mar
2016 21:44 UTC (GMT)
25For example, The Irish News has articles such as ï¾÷mï¾÷s ceolmhar do
laochra an ï¾÷irï¾÷ Amach, Robert McMillen, 03/02/2016, accessed 3/7/2016 at
http://www.irishnews.com/arts/thebluffer/2016/03/02/news/o-mo-s-ceolmhar-do-laochra-an-e-iri-amach-
435901/.
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but only 5.5% of the Finnish population speaks Swedish.
• Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania: A large part of the domestic population speaks Russian
and there are numerous Russian newspapers.
• Liechtenstein, other small countries: There are too few data points available.
Total average circulation of daily newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants is the main dependent
variable. Its mean is 251 (σ = 129), with Norway having the highest per capita circulation
with 562 over the years and Portugal the lowest one with 28.
I use a various controls in the regressions that may influence the domestic newspaper in-
dustry. These include internet penetration, year dummies, GDP per capita (PPP, constant
$2005), and unemployment. In additional regressions, I include the share of the population
that is between 15 and 64 years old, as these are likely to represent the majority of newspa-
pers readers, as well as the share of the population living in an urban environment. Lastly,
I include variables that capture educational attainment such as the share of the population
without schooling or average number of years of schooling.
Table 3.7 presents the results for the regression of aggregate newspaper sales on language
efficiency. Specification (1) regresses daily newspaper sales per 1,000 people on language
efficiency controlling for internet penetration, GDP per capita, unemployment, and time
dummies. The coefficient on language efficiency, βL, is significantly positive βL = 490.2∗∗.
In this regression, internet penetration is significantly positively correlated with newspa-
per sales (p < 0.05). Internet presents a modern alternative to newspapers and its penetra-
tion rapidly increased over the years. However, my data set is from the early age of internet,
so many newspapers had not yet launched their online presence at the earliest dates in my
data set. For example, the website of the New York Times only launched in January of
1996.26 The interaction between internet and newspapers may therefore be different in my
data set than in one comprising later data. Year dummies are decreasing, reflecting the
26From: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/22/business/the-new-york-times-introduces-a-web-site.html,
retracted 1/4/2015
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general trend of decreasing newspaper sales observed both in Europe and the US. The signs
of the point estimates of GDP and unemployment are positive and negative, resp.
Specification (2) includes the share of the population between 15 and 64 years (Pop1564)
and the share of the population living in an urban environment (Urban). The coefficient on
language efficiency is only slightly smaller in size β(2)L = 462.9
∗ and still significant, while
neither Pop1564 nor Urban are significant.
In specifications (3) and (4), I also include the percentage of the population with no
schooling (NoSchool) and the average years of schooling (Y rsSchooling). These two vari-
ables are from the Barro Lee education data setBarro and Lee [2013], which provides data
only in 5 year intervals (i.e., 1995, 2000, 2005, etc.), so I linearly interpolate the missing
values. When including these variables, the coefficient on language efficiency drops substan-
tially to β(3)L = 174.7 (p > 0.1) and β
(4)
L = 274.5 (p > 0.1) and is no longer significantly
different from zero. However, it is unclear whether these changes come from including ed-
ucation indices or because the included indicators are linearly interpolated and therefore
reduce actual power. Regarding the estimates of the education indices, more people with
no schooling decreases newspaper sales, while the average number of years of schooling in-
creases newspaper sales. This suggests that education has a positive impact on newspaper
sales (while noting that neither one is significant). This is consistent with the estimates
from the individual-level survey data, where more education years are positively correlated
with newspaper reading.
While limited in its power and in the range of controls that can be included, these results
support the previous finding that language efficiency significantly affects the newspaper
industry and also supports the model's prediction of higher sales in countries with more
efficient languages. However, the results substantially change when education indices are
included, which suggests the importance to control for education at an aggregate level. The
lowest estimate when including education indices, specification (3), implies that language
efficiency would increase sales of Spanish newspapers by 15% if their language was English,
which is comparable to the individual-level survey results.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspapers per 1000 Newspapers per 1000 Newspapers per 1000 Newspapers per 1000
Lang. efficiency 490.2∗∗ 462.9∗ 174.7 274.5
(219.9) (224.3) (220.6) (323.8)
% Internet 3.953∗∗ 3.847∗∗∗ 3.451∗∗ 3.623∗∗
(1.306) (1.220) (1.239) (1.355)
GDP per capita 0.00394∗ 0.00309 0.00332 0.00325
(0.00190) (0.00256) (0.00214) (0.00208)
Unemployment -2.383 -2.615 -0.0736 -2.390
(3.646) (3.512) (2.664) (3.297)
% Living Urbanly 0.650 0.680 0.453
(1.896) (1.607) (1.770)
% Age 15 to 64 -6.694 -6.794 -9.322
(9.275) (11.09) (10.69)
% No Schooling -12.23∗∗
(4.297)
Avg. Years of Schooling 18.78
(20.29)
Constant -277.2 174.4 475.0 357.4
(253.3) (774.1) (877.5) (871.7)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 154 154 154 154
Adjusted R2 0.756 0.758 0.807 0.770
Standard errors clustered (by country), significance via percentile-t bootstrap (500)
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.7: Effect of language efficiency on aggregate newspaper sales
3.5 Voter Turnout and Newspapers
After examining the link between language efficiency and newspapers in the previous section,
I now use it to disentangle the causal effect of newspaper readership on voter turnout across
European countries. Newspapers and printed media have long been credited for advancing
a healthy political environment by expressing popular opinions and discussing social topics.
But a direct estimation of this link is likely to suffer from reverse causality as politically
active citizens may also be more interested in political news stories and as such read more
newspapers. To address this, I employ an instrumental variable approach using variation in
language efficiency across European countries.
As mentioned above, I provide evidence that language efficiency affects newspapers
through a reduction in production costs. This suggests that language efficiency is exogenous
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to political engagement of voters as political advertisement through TV or radio does not
rely as extensively on the written word as newspapers do. Moreover, [Pellegrino et al., 2011]
finds that verbal language, not written language as in the present study, exhibit a simi-
lar information rate across languages, i.e., Spanish and English transmit a similar amount
of information per second. And since advertisements in TV and radio often use verbal
communication, these forms of advertisement are less likely to influenced by language char-
acteristics.
The European Social Survey, which I describe in the previous section, contains the ques-
tion Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last
[country] national election in [month/year]?. Its response consists of 3 main categories,
Yes, No, and Not eligible to vote. I denote answers to this variable by votei, where i
stands for respondent i. Additionally, respondents are asked about their interest in politics,
How interested would you say you are in politics and available answers range from very
interested, quite interested, hardly interested, to not at all interested. From this, I
construct a variable polatalli that captures whether a respondent is interested in politics at
all, polatalli = polintri 6= "not at all interested".
In the whole sample, 93% of respondents say they are eligible to vote in their respective
countries, and of those who are eligible to vote, 76% claim they do. The majority of respon-
dents who are eligible to vote say they are either quite interested (34%) or hardly interested
(36%), while 20% say they are not at all interested in politics. Thus, 80% of respondents
are at least somewhat interested in politics, which increases to 86% for those who voted.
In contrast, only 73% of immigrants respondents who immigrated after turning 21 and
who are considered native speakers (as defined above) are eligible to vote,27 with 59% of
them stating they voted in the last national election. Of immigrants who are eligible to vote,
76% say they are at least somewhat interested in politics, with 33% being quite interested
and 31% being hardly interested. Lastly, of those who voted, 79% say they are somewhat
interested in politics.
27And also excluding immigrants according to nationality restrictions as discussed above.
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My results suggest that language efficiency may be a weak instrument when considering
all individuals in the data, I thus focus my analysis on the subsample of immigrants, as seen
in table 3.8.
{votei, polatalli} = α+ βnnewsi + γxxi + ε,
s.t. {native speakeri} = 1
{ age at immigrationi ≥ 21 yrs} = 1
{eligible to vote} = 1
I find that in a simple regression, without making use of the instruments, the relationship
between how much time is spent on reading newspaper nwsptoti and the likelihood of voting
votei is insignificant and of small magnitude βn = 0.0108 (0.0100) (1). When using two-stage
least squares, I find that the point estimate increases substantially and becomes significantly
positive β2SLSn = 0.251
∗∗ (0.121) (2). The magnitude of these coefficients imply that reading
newspapers 5 more minutes every day increases one's likelihood of voting by around 8.4%.
This suggests that, for immigrants, newspapers indeed have a positive relationship on the
likelihood of voting even when controlling for the inherent simultaneity. The direction of
the change indicates a downward bias, which points towards a negative correlation between
reading behavior and voting. I find a similar result, albeit not similar in significance, when
looking at political interest polatallij rather than voting behavior: in the OLS regression,
the coefficient on newspaper consumption is βn(I) = 0.0396∗∗ (0.0155) (5), with the point
estimate increasing to βn(I) = 0.121∗∗ (0.117) (6), but which is not significant. Similar
results hold for regressions using whether voters read newspapers at all nwsatallij (specifi-
cations 3, 4, 7 and 8). The first stage F-value is around 12 when using newspaper reading
time nwsptoti, around 8 to 10 for reading propensity nwsatalli, suggesting that these results
may suffer from weak instrument bias.
These findings provide evidence that newspaper reading behavior indeed increases politi-
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cal engagement for the subsample of immigrants considered here. The downward bias in the
OLS results may be due to that politically interested citizens consult the internet or the TV
for their political news, thus driving them away from newspapers. While the exact reason
why voters turn out is still a puzzle (voting paradox), this study provides some evidence
that political interest or awareness of current political affairs drives voters to the polls, thus
shedding some light on a fundamental process of democracy.
Dep. variable Voted Voted Interest Interest
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reading time 0.0108 0.251** 0.0396** 0.121
(0.0100) (0.121) (0.0155) (0.117)
Reading at all -0.0243 0.869 0.141*** 0.389
(0.0334) (11.58) (0.0540) (0.629)
First-stage F 11.82 8.88 12.42 10.74
Observations 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511
Adjusted R2 0.3332 0.3328 0.1855 0.1217 0.1918 0.1258
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 500 repetitions, clustered by country
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 3.8: Relationship between newspaper reading behavior and voting behavior or political
interest, restricted to immigrants only. Using both OLS and 2SLS approach with language
efficiency as excluded instrument. News type (1) uses newspaper reading time, news type
(2) uses whether respondents read newspapers at all.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proofs
3.6.1.1 Supply side
Proposition For any quality q, P ∗(q) is increasing in cq and therefore decreasing
in language efficiency L.
Proof. It holds that
P ∗ =
(B + q) · (1 + 2 · cq)− a
2 · (1 + cq) .
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Taking derivatives of P ∗ wrt cq yields
P ∗cq =
a+B + q
2(1 + cq)2
which is positive for any quality q. Further, cq is increasing in L by assumption.
Proposition The share of high-quality newspapers εh(L) is weakly increasing
in language efficiency L.
Proof. By assumption, ch is more strongly decreasing than cl in L. The result then follows
from that a newspaper chooses high quality if
(a+B + qh)
2
(a+B + ql)2
>
(1 + ch)
(1 + cl)
as an increase in L decreases the RHS and thus weakly increases the share of newspapers
for which this inequality holds.
Corollary If total newspaper sales D in the economy are decreasing in language
efficiency L, average quality of newspapers Q must be increasing in language
efficiency L.
Proof. Total sales can be written as
D = DhP (q = qh) +DlP (q = ql).
Without loss of generality, set ql = 1. Average quality per sale Q can be written as
Q = P (q = qh) · qh · Dh
D
+ P (q = ql) · Dl
D
= P (q = qh) · (qh − 1) · Dh
D
+ 1
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Then, abbreviating with pi = P (q = qi), we get
Q = 1 + (qh − 1) phDh
phDh + plDl
= 1 + (qh − 1) 1
1 + plDlphDh
It then follows that ∂Q/∂L > 0 iff plDlphDh < 0. When language efficiency increases, the
optimal price for any quality level falls due to the previous lemma. This increases sales
fixing the quality level, so ∂D(P ∗, q)/∂L > 0. Moreover, an increase in language efficiency
weakly increases the share of high-quality newspapers, so ∂P (q = qh)/∂L > 0. Thus, phDh
increases when language efficiency increases. This implies that for total sales to decrease it
must be that Dlpl decreases, which then implies the result.
Proposition The relative amount of pictures to both advertisement ia and text
i
t is (weakly) increasing in language efficiency L.
The ratio of advertisement to text at is (weakly) increasing in language efficiency
L if advertisement costs are less responsive to language efficiency than costs for
text.
Proof. This follows directly from the relative costs of each input: If an input is cheaper,
fixing its marginal impact of quality, the relative amount will weakly increase.
3.6.1.2 Demand side
Proposition If the impact of personal components pk on reading time Tk is
sufficiently weak, a more efficient language implies higher sales D and less time
T¯ spent on reading newspapers on average.
Proof. Language efficiency reduces reading time as ∂T/∂L ≤ 0. A shorter necessary reading
time increases utility ∂u/∂Tk ≤ 0. This implies that the utility of each individual increases
and thus sales increase.
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Next, given that the impact of personal components pk on reading time Tk is sufficiently
weak, we can drop pk from the definition of T . Thus, the only factor that varies by individual
that affects reading time is perceived quality. We now want to show that
T¯ (q, L) < T¯ (q, L+ δ)
for all δ > 0: Pick any δ > 0. Decompose the set of readers into those who would read at L
and L + δ and those who would read only at L + δ. Denote these sets by L and L+ resp.
Then,
T¯ (q, L+ δ) =
|L|
|L|+ |L+| T¯ (q, L+ δ|L) +
|L+|
|L|+ |L+| T¯ (q, L+ δ|L+).
Compared with T¯ (q, L|L), we know that
T¯ (q, L|L) > T¯ (q, L+ δ|L)
by definition of T . Further, since q˜k increases both uk and Tk, it holds that
T¯ (q, L+ δ|L) > T¯ (q, L+ δ|L+),
thus
T¯ (q, L) < T¯ (q, L+ δ).
3.6.2 Tables
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Propensity Time Propensity Cond. time Time Time
Language efficiency 2.370** 2.178** 0.785** 0.823 2.178** 1.189
(0.986) (1.037) (0.368) (1.558) (1.032) (0.865)
Immigrants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Probit A18 A18 A18 A18 A18
Observations 711 861 861 583 861 857
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.061 0.066 0.077 0.110
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 500 repetitions, clustered by country
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 3.9: Effect of language efficiency on newspaper reading behavior (reading time, reading
propensity, cond. reading time). First specification is a probit model with reading propensity
as dependent variable, where the coefficient is the estimated coefficient in the probit model;
the specifications with A18 denote alternative linear regressions for immigrants that are
native speakers as defined in the text and immigrated at 18 or later.
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